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SERVICE DISCRETION AND BURDEN OF PROOF IN
INTERNATIONAL TAX CASES INVOLVING
SECTION 482*

Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code allows the Internal
Revenue Service to "distribute, apportion, or allocate" the "gross
income, deductions, credits, or allowances" of organizations under
common control between such organizations, whenever necessary
"to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income" of any
of these organizations.' Congress adopted section 482 and its predecessors primarily to deal with cases involving United States corporations and their overseas afffilates, 2 and this has remained the
* The author wishes to thank Professors Alan Gunn and Russell K. Osgood of the
Cornell Law School for their many helpful insights.
1. In any case df two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or
not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or
not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the
Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if
he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in
order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any such
organizations, trades, or businesses.
I.R.C. § 482 (1976).
For summaries in English of laws in 15 other countries that resemble section 482, see
Andersson, Finland,56b CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL 11/175, 11/175-83
(1971); Bechinie, Austria, id at 11/87, 11/95-96; Brown, Canada,id at 11/97, 11/125-26;
Casas, Mexico, id at 11/243, 11/243-49; Cocco, Ial, id at 11/227, 11/239; Davidson,
UnitedKingdom, id at 11/293, 11/309; Dequesne, France,id at 11/187, 11/202-03; Lodin,
Sweden, id at I/313, 11/326-27; Lopez, Argentina, id at 11/51, 11/80-81; Maria de
Lourdes Correia e Vale, Portugal,id at 11/271, 11/287-88; Neeman, Israel,id at 11/207,
11/222-23; Oberson, Switzerland, id at 11/333, 11/346; Spierdijk, Netherlands, id at II/
251, 11/267-68; Strobl, Germany, id at 11/1, 11/45-49; Valdes de Murfia, Spain, id at II/
131, 11/142. For a comparison of French and United States law on the taxation of
intercompany transfers, see Sokol, French Taxation of Inter-Company Transfer Agreements. Article 57 v. Section 482, 12 INT'L LAW. 639 (1978). For United Nations discussion of the taxation of multinational corporations, see U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL AFFAIRS, THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS ON DEVELOPMENT
AND ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 88-94 (1974); U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL AFFAIRS, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT 66-70

(1973).
2. The earliest direct predecessor of section 482 is section 240(d) of the Revenue Act
of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227, 260 (1921). Congress intended section 240(d) of the 1921
Act to apply primarily to the foreign subsidiaries of United States corporations. S. REP.

No. 275, 6th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1921). See Hammer, Morrione & Ryan, Concepts and
Techniques in Determining the Reasonableness of Intercompany PricingBetween United
States Corporationsand Their Overseas Subsidiaries,30 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1407, 1409
(1972) ("The statute is aimed particularly at non-arm's-length intercompany prices which
have the effect of shifting profit from a U.S. taxpayer to a foreign affiliate outside the
taxing jurisdiction of the United States.")
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section's principal purpose.3 In the early 1960s, after hundreds of
United States corporations had established tax haven corporations
overseas, 4 the Service began to apply section 482 vigorously to international transactions.5 Today, many, if not most, large United
the Service to
States corporations with foreign affiliates can expect
6
allocate income under section 482 at some time.
3. In 1966, an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury wrote that section 482's current
importance "is almost entirely in terms of its application to the foreign income field."
Surrey, The United States Tax System and International Tax Relationshs-Current
Developments, 1965-1966, in TAXATION OF FOREIGN INCOME 256, 282 (1966). See also
Eustice, Tax ProblemsArising From TransactionsBetween Affiliated or ControlledCorporations, 23 TAX L. REV. 451, 482 (1968) ("The major recent developments under section
482, both judicial and administrative, have been concerned with the treatment of transactions between domestic and foreign affiliates, for it is here that the tax stakes (and the
consequent possibilities for abuse) loom largest."); Plumb & Kapp, Reallocation of
Income andDeductions UnderSection 482, 41 TAXEs 809, 820 (1963) ("It is in the area of
intercompany pricing of products, on an international stage, that Section 482 is destined
to play its next, and perhaps most significant, role.")
4. M. DUERR, TAX ALLOCATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 4 (Conference
Board Report No. 555, 1972).
5. Bischel, Tax Allocations ConcerningInter-Company PricingTransactions in Foreign Operations: .4 Reappraisal,13 VA. J. INT'L L. 490, 492 & n.14 (1973); Hilinski, Some
Thoughts on Section 482, in TAXATION OF FOREIGN INCOME 147, 148 (1966); Plumb &
.Kapp, supra note 3, at 820; Rothkopf, Section 482 in Perspective: A Review of the Pro-.
posed Regulations, 44 TAXES 727, 728 (1966); Thrower, Recent developments in international tax administrationand enforcement, 1 TAX ADVISOR 479, 482 (1970); Comment,
LZ. C. § 482 and IntercompanyPricing: A Post1968 Overviewfor the InternationalPracti-

tioner, 8 TEx.

INT'L

L.J. 219, 219-20 (1973).

In 1958, Commerce Clearing House editors reported that "[t]he provisions of Sec. 482,
though sparingly applied in the past, become increasingly important when tax-saving
methods become the target of scrutiny, as they are at present." [1958] 3 STAND. FED.
TAX REP. (CCH) 2993.01, at 32,169. As late as 1960, however, Prentice-Hall editors
noted that "[a]lthough provisions corresponding to Sec. 482 have been in the law since
the 1921 Act, application has been limited and litigated cases have been few." [1960] 1
FED. TAXES (P-H) 6900.
For information concerning the Service's program for auditing transactions between
United States corporations and their foreign subsidiaries, see I INTERNAL REVENUE
MANUAL-AtrDIT (CCH) ch. 4233 [510] to [522], at 7281-57 to -59 (Aug., 1981), 4233
[523] to [500-12], at 7281-61 to 7283-75 (May, 1981); 2 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUALAUDIT (CCH) ch. 428(11) [42(10)0] to [42(10)1.5], at 7319 to 7319-2 (Dec., 1981); Bacon,
Compliance Problemsin Taxation of InternationalOperations,in TAXATION OF FOREIGN
INCOME 160, 160-61 (1966); Thrower, supra.
For background information on The Office of International Operations, see INTERNAL
REVENUE MANUAL-AUDIT (CCH) ch. 42(10)(10).4, at 7319-9 (Dec., 1981); 2 R.
RHOADES & M. LANGER, INCOME TAXATION OF FOREIGN RELATED TRANSACTIONS
(MB) § 8.01-.06 (1971, 1981 printing).
6. A recent study of 62 major United States corporations doing business abroad
found that over half had had section 482 allocations between 1965 and 1977. Bums, How
IRS applies the intercompanypricing rules of Section 482:. ACorporate Survey, 52 J.
TAX'N 308, 311 (1980). Three other corporations did not participate in the survey,
because they were currently undergoing section 482 allocations. Id at 308. An earlier
study of 512 companies found that over half had had section 482 alocations relating to
international operations during the 1960s. M. DUERR, supra note 4, at 6. A Treasury
Department study reported that, in calendar years 1968 to 1969, the Service's examining
agents considered making 871 section 482 allocations and actually proposed 458 allocations-allocations that aggregated $662 million. [1973] 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH)
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Congress worded section 482 quite generally.

Courts have

interpreted this section to provide the Service with considerable discretion in making allocations and to allow taxpayers to overturn the

Service's allocations only if the taxpayer can prove the allocation
was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. 7 Past regulations accompanying section 482 furnished little substantive guidance, requiring
only that the allocation reflect a general arm's length standard.8

Corporations involved in international business complained that this
generality made it difficult to plan the business of their foreign affiliates.9 The Treasury Department responded by issuing detailed regu-

lations that provided standards to govern allocations under section
482.10
The current regulation provides that "[t]he standard to be
applied in every case is that of an 'uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at

1 6419, at 71,195, 71,196, 71,203, 71,205 [hereinafter cited as Treasury Dep't Study]
(reprinting U.S. Department of the Treasury, News Release (Jan. 8, 1973), also reprinted
in 2 R. RHOADES & M. LANGER, supra note 5, ch. 7 app. at 7-89, 7-93, 7-108, 7-110).
The study collected much more information than the Treasury Department has
released to the public. For example, the study: 1). classified by country the adjustments
made; 2). accumulated data for treaty and nontreaty countries; 3). had separate data for
Puerto Rican and Western Hemisphere countries; and 4). provided information on the
sources of the unrelated comparable pricing data the Service used in making allocations.
Kauder, InternationalAllocationsofIncome: ProblemsofAdministration and Compliance,
9 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 23 (1974). Kauder adds, "Treasury has not stated why the
additional material has not been published." Id
7. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 126.
9. Rothkopf, supra note 5, at 728; see Hilsinki, supra note 5, at 148; Stewart, Compliance Problems with Emphasis on Offece of InternationalOperations Coverage, in TAXATION OF FOREIGN INCOME 175, 183-84 (1966).
10. See infra notes 130-40 and accompanying text. For general discussions of the
regulation's provisions, see Eustice, Affiliated CorporationsRevisited Recent Developments UnderSections 482 and367, 24 TAX L. REv. 101, 101-13 (1968); Hammer, Section
482-4pportionmentand.411ocationGuidelines, 26 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 693 (1968); Holzman, What are the limits on the Commissioner'spower to reallocate income, etc. under
Section 482?, 12 TAX'N FOR AcCT.350 (1974); Jenks, TreasuryRegulations under Section
482, 23 TAX LAW. 279 (1970).
During the preparation of the regulation and soon after its release, senior Service officials explained how the Service planned to administer the regulation. See Cohen, How
the IRS Intends to Administer the New Regulations Under Section 482, 28 J. TAX'N 73
(1968); Cohen, Administration of the Section 482 Regulations, 19 TAX EXECUTIVE 233
(1967); Rothkopf, supra note 5; Surrey, Treasury'sNeed to Curb TaxAvoidance in Foreign
Business Through Use of 482, 28 J. TAX'N 75 (1968); see also [1968] 7 STAND. FED. TAX
REIP. (CCH) 16740 (reprinting U.S. Treasury Department, Release F-1217 (April 16,
1968)) (Service policy in enforcing the regulation); [1966] 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP.
(CCH) 6685 (reprinting U.S. Treasury Department, Release (Aug. 2, 1966)) (Service
policy in enforcing the 1966 proposed regulation). Sheldon S. Cohen was then the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service. Stanley S. Surrey was then the Assistant
Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy. Arthur J.Rothkopf was then the Treasury Department's Associate Tax Legislative Counsel (International).
In the early 1970s, the Treasury Department indicated that it was considering a major
revision of the regulation. Aland, Section 482.- 1971 Version, 49 TAXEs 815, 827-28
(1971); Kauder, supra note 6, at 27. Nevertheless, no revision has been forthcoming.
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arm's length with another uncontrolled taxpayer."" The current
regulation, however, also provides detailed methods for deriving
arm's length prices for five major categories of intercompany trans14
fers: loans or advances, 12 services, 13 use of tangible property,
transfers or use of intangible property, 15 and sales of tangible
property.16
The regulation bases all section 482 allocations on the prices
used in transactions between unrelated parties that are most similar
to the transaction under examination. Often, however, there are no
transactions closely resembling the one under audit.17 For example,
the taxpayer may dominate a particular market, or may sell a unique
product. When there are no similar transactions between unrelated
parties under comparable market conditions, determining what a
taxpayer would have earned is a speculative endeavor, and estimates
8
can vary widely.1
Section 482 allocations between foreign and domestic affiliates
are often quite large and frequently involve millions of dollars.19
11. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1), T.D. 6595, 1962-1 C.B. 43, 50. The regulation defines
the "'true taxable income' of a controlled taxpayer as the taxable income the controlled
taxpayer would have received had it "dealt with the other member or members of the
group [of controlled taxpayers] at arm's length." Id § 1.482-1(a)(6), T.D. 6595, 1962-1
C.B. 43, 50. The regulation provides that the Service may allocate income to reflect an
arm's length price even when the taxpayer has unintentionally failed to apply an arm's
length price. Id § IA82-1(c), T.D. 6595, 1962-1 C.B. 43, 51.
12. Id § 1.482-2(a), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 223-24, amended by T.D. 7394,
1976-1 C.B. 135, 135-36.
13. Id § 1.482-2(b), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 224-28, amended by T.D. 6998,
1969-1 C.B. 144, 144-47.
14. Id § 1.482-2(c), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 228-30.
15. Id § 482-2(d), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218,230-34, amendedby T.D. 6964, 1968-2
C.B. 203, 203.
16. Id § 1.482-2(e), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 234-42, amended by T.D. 7170,
1972-1 C.B. 178, 179. The regulation does not claim that these five categories cover all
types of intercompany business transactions. See id § 1.482-1(d)(1), T.D. 6952, 1968-1
C.B. 218, 219-23.
17. M. DUERR, supra note 4, at 12-16; Aland, supra note 10, at 819; Eustic, supra
note 3, at 514; Kauder, supra note 6, at 25; Mihaly, Intercompany Pricing, Offset Ad!tstments and Constructive Dividends Resulting From Section 482 Adjustments, 25 MAJOR
TAX PLAN. 731, 746, 749 (1973); Note, MultinationalCorporationsand IncomeAllocation
Under Section 482 of the InternalRevenue Code, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1202, 1220-21 (1976).
18. In the case that this Note examines later, for example, the Second Circuit noted
that the Commissioner's allocation had been $52 million, while the Tax Court's had been
$27 million. United States Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, 617 F.2d 942, 951 n.l 1 (2d Cir.
1980).
Duerr describes a number of instances in which corporations, by supplying additional
information, persuaded Service agents to drop proposed allocations. M. DUERR, supra
note 4, at 14-20. Kauder notes that "nothing like" the Service agents' $662 million in
proposed allocations in 1968-69, see supra note 6, survived later review. Kauder, supra
note 6, at 21.
19. A recent study of Fortune 500 corporations reported that the Service's proposed
assessments averaged nearly one million dollars for the responding corporations that
experienced section 482 allocations from 1966 to 1976. Bums, supra note 6, at 311.
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These allocations can also have many side effects on the domestic
corporation's taxes far beyond the allocation itself 20 A subsidiary
might lose its status as a Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation,
for example, or the parent might become classified as a personal
holding company.2 ' Moreover, an allocation often subjects the foreign affiliate's income to taxation both in the United States and
abroad.22
Unfortunately, with respect to sales of tangible property, the
Service often fails to follow the regulation's prescribed methods for
allocating income under section 482,23 and sometimes acts heavy20. For a discussion of the collateral tax effects of section 482 allocations, see Aland,
supra note 10, at 833-38; Bischel, supra note 5 at 504-09; Eustice, supra note 3, at 518-24;
Seieroe & Gerber, Section 482-Still Growing at the Age'Of 50, 46 TAXES 893, 904-07
(1968); Comment, supra note 5, at 241-43. For a description of the adverse effects on
business operations, see M. DUERR, supra note 4, at 56-63.
21. See Aland, supra note 10, at 837.
22. A recent study reports that section 482 allocations caused responding companies
to pay taxes on the same income both to the United States and to a foreign country in
52% of the cases involving allocations for intercompany export sales. Burns, supra note
6, at 312. These companies were unable to obtain refunds, because either the foreign
government disagreed with the allocation, the statute of limitations had elapsed, the foreign government had no procedure for refund claims, or applying for a refund claim
would have been too costly. Id See also M. DUERR, supra note 4, at 61-62 (approximately 47% of the responding companies experiencing allocations reported that the allocations resulted in international double taxation).
The Treasury Department has established a procedure for obtaining refunds from foreign governments with which the United States has an income tax treaty. Rev. Proc. 7018, 1970-2 C.B. 493. Nevertheless, the procedure presents difficulties, see Bischel, supra
note 5, at 504, and companies rarely take advantage of the procedure. Burns, supra note
6, at 312. For taxable years beginning before January 1, 1963, the Treasury Department
has allowed companies an offset against their United States taxes to the extent a section
482 allocation caused double taxation. Rev. Proc. 64-54, 1962-2 C.B. 1008. Cf. Rev.
Proc. 72-22, 1972-1 C.B. 747 (extending the offset of Revenue Procedure 64-54 to United
States taxpayers controlled by foreign corporations). Finally, the Treasury Department
allows a taxpayer that has experienced a section 482 allocation to treat dividends from its
foreign affiliate as a payment toward the allocation, Rev. Proc. 65-17, 1965-1 C.B. 833, if
fraud was not responsible for the necessity of an allocation. Rev. Proc. 65-17, amendment 1, 1966-2 C.B. 1211. For other minor provisions granting relief, see Comment,
supra note 5, at 243 n.174.
23. See infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text. Treasury Regulation § 1.482-2(e)
requires the Service to apply one of three described methods if data on comparable transactions are available. See supranotes 36-44 and accompanying text. The following chart
presents the findings of three major studies on the frequency with which the Service uses
these methods in making section 482 allocations.
Study
Method Employed
Comparable Uncontrolled Price
Resale Price
Cost-Plus
Other

Treasury Dep't

Burns

Duerr

20.7%
10.9%
27.6%
40.8%

24%
14%
30%
32%

28%
13%
23%
36%

Treasury Dep't Study, supra note 6, at 71,198, 71,207, reprintedin 2 RHOADES & M.
LANGER, supra note 5, ch. 7 app., at 7-89, 7-100, 7-112; Bums, supra note 6, at 309; M.
DUERR, supra note 4, at 12-13.

208

COJNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:203

handedly toward taxpayers.2 4 Taxpayers, however, must overcome a
difficult burden of production to overturn a section 482 allocation, so
often even these Service allocations prevail. By not following the
regulation, the Service undermines the protections the regulation is
designed to promote. Particularly when no directly comparable
transaction exists, taxpayers find themselves vulnerable to potentially large allocations, based on a speculative ad hoc method, with
consequent losses of special tax status and double taxation of foreign

income.
Two recent cases have addressed the problem of how the regulation should be interpreted to limit the Service's discretion in allocating under section 482. In EZ Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
United States,25 the Court of Claims interpreted the regulatioif to
more freely allow the Service to allocate income under section 482
based on ad hoc methods, and required the taxpayer to overcome a
very difficult burden of production. In United States Steel Corp. v.
Commissioner,26 the Second Circuit imposed a burden of production
that was much easier to overcome than courts previously had
required.
Many commentators have advocated modifying or repealing
that part of section 482's regulation that concerns sales of tangible
property.2 7 The Treasury Department, however, does' not appear
24. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
25. 608 F.2d 445 (Ct. Cl. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 962 (1980).
26. 617 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1980).
27. Some commentators have recommended that the regulation include safe haven
rules for splitting profits with intercompany prices. See, e.g., Bischel, supra note 5, at 511
& n.l 16; Hammer, Morrione & Ryan, supra note 2, at 1437-39; Kauder, supra note 6, at
29-30.
The American Bar Association has drafted two proposals for safe haven rules on
intercompany pricing. One proposal is for related distributors and manufacturers, and
allocates the related companies' total income according to a formula using the manufacturing and marketing costs. W. GIFFORD, INTERNATIONAL TAX PLANNING 157, 157-58
(1974) (reprinting American Bar Association Draft Proposed Text-Safe Haven from
Profit Split). The other proposal also concerns related distributors and manufacturers,
but sets up a formula using average industry markups. W. GIFFORD, supra, at 158, 15860 (reprinting American Bar Association Draft Proposed Text-Safe Haven from Manufacturer's Cost).
Some commentators have 6alled for generally simpler regulatory guidance for the taxpayer who must set intercompany prices. Cole, U.S.A.: ProgressReport on Taxation of
Foreign Source Income, 26 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 54, 55, 57-58

(1972).
Others would prohibit the Service from allocating income under section 482 as long as
the taxpayer comes within the bounds of reasonable profit splits as set out in guidelines.
Fuller, Section 482 Revisited, 31 TAX L. Rlv. 475, 514-16 (1976); c. Mihaly, supra note
17, at 750-51 (absent comparable transactions, no allocation, if taxpayer has set reasonably fair prices in good faith). A few Tax Court cases have taken this approach. E.g.,
Lufkin Foundry & Mach. Co. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (PH) 71,101, at 422, 459-60
(1971) (upholding 50%-50% profit split between buyer and seller), rev'd, 468 F.2d 805
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ready to reject the regulation, 28 and the courts have generally followed the regulation to the exclusion of prior case law. 29 This Note
(5th Cir. 1972); PPG Industries Inc. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 928, 997 (1970) (upholding
59%-41% and 56%-44% profit splits between domestic seller and foreign buyer).
Others propose that section 482 should apply only to cases of deliberate tax avoidance.
E g., PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON BUSINESS TAXATION, BUSINEss TAXATION 54-57
(1970); Aland, supra note 10, at 819; Eustice, supra note 3, at 483; Jenks, TreasuryRegulaions Under Section 482, 23 TAX LAW. 279, 312 (1972).
For an excellent critique of the present regulation and an overview of the proposals to
modify section 482, see Note, MultinationalCorporations and Income Allocation Under
Section 482 of the InternalRevenue Code, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1202 (1976). The Note
suggests that the government ignore the organizational structures of commonly controlled enterprises and tax, instead, their lines of business, each as one unit. The Note
would classify these lines of business according to an objective system of industry or
product characteristics, such as the Standard Industrial Classification. Id at 1234-38.
28. The Treasury Department is preparing to modify Treasury Regulation § 1.4822(c)(2), the part of the regulation for section 482 that concerns arm's length rental
charges. The Service has prepared a preliminary draft to revise Treasury Regulation
§ IA82-2(c)(2), and the Treasury Department is now reviewing it. Telephone interview
with Kent Schreiner, Legislation and Regulations Division, Office of the Chief Counsel,
Internal Revenue Service (May 20, 1982).
29. Section 482 makes no mention of an arm's length standard. Case law before the
1968 regulations sometimes rejected an arm's length standard in favor of determining
whether the profit allocation appeared subjectively reasonable. In Frank v. International
Can. Corp., 308 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1962), the Ninth Circuit rejected the arm's length
standard in favor of a reasonable return standard. Id at 528. The court said, "we do not
agree with the Commissioner's contention that 'arm's length bargaining' is the sole criterion for applying the statutory language of§ 45 in determining what the 'true net income'
is of each 'controlled taxpayer."' Id (emphasis in original). Section 45, of the Revenue
Act of 1938, ch. 289, 52 Stat. 447, 474 (1938) (repealed 1954), is section 482's predecessor.
The court cited a number of cases that had applied § 45 without using an arm's length
standard, id at 529 & nn.8-14: Friedlander Corp. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 70, 77 (1955)
(full fair value), acq. 1956-1 C.B. 3, withdrawaland nonacq. 1972-1 C.B. 3, acq. 1972-1
C.B. 2; Polak's Frutal Works, Inc. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 953, 976 (1954) (fair and
reasonable prices), acq. 1955-1 C.B. 6, withdrawalandnonacq. 1972-1 C.B. 3; Motor Sec.
Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 1074, 1082 (1952) (method that seems not unreasonable); Palm Beach Aero Corp. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1169, 1176 (1952) (fair consideration that reflects arm's length dealing), acq. 1952-2 C.B. 2; Grenada Indus., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 17 T.C. 231, 260 (1951) (fair price, including a reasonable profit), acq.
1952-2 C.B. 2, nonacq. 1952-2 C.B. 2, withdrawalandacq. 1972-2 C.B. 2, a id, 202 F.2d
873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 819 (1953); Seminole Flavor Co. v. Commissioner, 4
T.C. 1215, 1232-33 (1945) (fair and reasonable contract, compensation that is fair and
fairly arrived at, and contract judged as to fairness), acq. 1945 C.B. 6, withdrawaland
nonacq. 1972-1 C.B. 3.
The Ninth Circuit, in Oil Base, Inc. v. Commissioner, 362 F.2d 212 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 928 (1966), strictly limited its holding in Frank v. InternationalCanadian
Corp. The taxpayer in Oil Base had argued that section 482 called for basing allbcations
on a fair and reasonable return rather than an arm's length standard. 362 F.2d at 214.
The Ninth Circuit applied the arm's length standard and said that a "permissible departure from the regulation's arm's length standard was, under the facts of [Frank], very
narrowly limited." Id In a later case, the Ninth Circuit showed that it would rely on the
Treasury Department regulation to the exclusion of all other standards. Kerry Inv. Co.
v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 108, 109 (9th Cir. 1974).
Cases from other jurisdictions that have approved of the section 482 regulation include
Kahler Corp. v. Commissioner, 486 F.2d 1,4 (8th Cir. 1973); B. Forman Co. v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 1144, 1155 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972); Local Finance
Corp. v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d 629, 632 (7th Cir.), cert.denied, 396 U.S. 956 (1969); Eli
Lilly & Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 990, 1000 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
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analyzes how best to interpret and apply the existing regulation. The
Note begins by interpreting the Du Pont and U.S. Steel cases. Later,
it analyzes the existing regulation within the framework of section
482 and the purposes that the Treasury Department intended the
regulation to promote. It concludes that the best method of interpreting the regulation is a modified version of the Second Circuit's
interpretation.
I
CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
REGULATION
The Du Pont and U.S. Steel cases highlight current problems in
interpreting section 482 and its regulation when no closely similar
uncontrolled transactions are available for comparison. The two
decisions differ significantly in the way they view the regulation for
section 482 and in their deference to the Service.
A. THE DU PONT CASE
In the late 1950s, E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Company
began a drive to expand its sales in Europe. In 1959, Du Pont organized a Swiss subsidiary, Du Pont de Nemours International S.A.
(DISA), which bought Du Pont's chemical products and then marketed them overseas. 30 DISA was exempt from United States taxes
and subject to a Swiss tax rate much lower than that of the United
States. 31 Du Pont formed DISA primarily for business reasons unrelated to taxation, but internal Du Pont correspondence shows that
Du Pont was interested in the possible tax advantages of selling
products to DISA at artificially low prices. 32 Using section 482, the
Courts generally sustain Treasury Department regulations unless unreasonable and
plainly inconsistent with the corresponding statute. Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber

Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948).
For the case law development of the methods for allocations under section 482 and the
regulation, see Fuller, supra note 27, at 505-16; Lewis, Section 482: An EminentAmendable Provision, 25 ALA. L. Rlv. 23, 38-46 (1972); Comment, supra note 5, at 227-40.
30. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9374k at 83, 895-96 (Ct. Cl., Trial Div., 1978), sustainedonrehearing,608 F.2d 445 (Ct. Cl.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 962 (1980).
31. See 608 F.2d at 447 & n.4. DISA paid less than nine percent in Swiss Federal
and cantonal taxes for 1959 and 1960. 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9374, at 83,912,
83,948 (findings 17 & 94).
32. 608 F.2d at 447. The court found that, by manipulating the prices on the products it sold to DISA, Du Pont had deliberately insulated DISA from any risk of loss and
shifted as large a share of the profits to the subsidiary'as was possible. Id at 448. One
early internal memorandum from Du Pont's tax planning department reviewed the possibility of a Service attack on its pricing method and concluded:
It would seem desirable to bill the tax haven subsidiary at less than an 'arm's
length' price because: (I) the pricing might not be challenged by the revenue
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Service allocated to Du Pont eighteen million dollars of DISAs
income for the period 1959 to 1960 33-resulting

in a deficiency of

34
more than nine million dollars for Du Pont.
The case fell within that part of the section 482 regulation for
intercompany pricing that concerns sales of tangible goods.35 The

regulation specifies three methods for determining an arm's length
price, in the following order of preference: first, the comparable

uncontrolled price method; second, the resale price method; and
third, the cost plus method.3 6 The comparable uncontrolled price
method derives an arm's length price by comparing similar sales
between unrelated parties involving identical or nearly identical
goods. 37 The resale price method establishes an arm's length price
agent; (2) if the pricing is challenged, we might sustain such transfer prices; (3) if
we cannot sustain the prices used, a transfer price will be negotiated which
should not be more than an 'arm's length' price and might be less; thus we would
be no worse off than we would have been had we billed at the higher price.
Id at 447 n.4 (quoting a Du Pont Treasurer's Department memorandum by W.F. Lewis
(Aug. 16, 1957)). Internal memoranda later called the proposed subsidiary a "'profit
sanctuary trading company,"' id (quoting a Du Pont Legal and Treasurer's Departments memorandum by R.A. Wentz and G.W. Morris (Mar. 7, 1958)), and one early
draft of a memorandum referred to the ""artificially" low price"' of the goods to be
sold to the proposed subsidiary, id (quoting a Du Pont International and Treasurer's
Departments draft memorandum by E. Robinson (Sept. 22, 1958)). For the full texts of
these communications, see 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9374, at 83,920-21, 83,925-26,
83,935 (findings 37, 42 & 62).
33. 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9374, at 83,911-12 (findings 2, 5, 10 & 14).
34. Id at 83,911 (finding 2).
In 1974, Kauder estimated that the Du Pont case would ultimately cost Du Pont and
the Government each as much as one million dollars. Kauder, supra note 6, at 27.
35. Treas. Reg. § 1A82-2(e), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 234-42, amended by T.D.
7170, 1972-1 C.B. 178, 179.
36. If comparable uncontrolled sales exist, the regulation requires the Service to use
the comparable uncontrolled price method. Id § 1.482-2(e)(I)(ii), T.D. 6952, 1968-1
C.B. 218, 234-35, amended by T.D. 7170, 1972-1 C.B. 178, 179. If no such sales exist and
an applicable resale price is available, the Service must use the resale price method, if the
controlled sale buyer does not add substantially to the property's value by physically
altering the property or by using intangible property. Id § 1.482-2(e)(1)(ii), (3)(ii), T.D.
6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 234-35, 238, amendedby T.D. 7170, 1972-1 C.B. 178, 179. Under
the remaining circumstances, the Service must apply either the resale price or the cost
plus method, depending on which method can more feasibly and more accurately estimate an arm's length price. Id § l.482-2(e)(1)(ii), (3)(iii), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218,
234-35, 238-39, amended by T.D. 7170, 1972-1 C.B. 178, 179. The regulation suggests
using'the method that requires fewer and easier calculations. Id § 1A82-2(e)(3)(iii),
T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 238-39. The regulation provides that, in general, the resale
price method is more appropriate when the controlled sale seller's functions are more
extensive and harder to evaluate than the controlled sale buyer's functions. Id
37. Id § 1A82-2(e)(2)(i)-(ii), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 235-36. The physical property and the circumstances involved in the uncontrolled sales must be "identical to the
physical property and circumstances involved in the controlled sales f or... so nearly
identical that any differences either have no effect on price 1]or... can be reflected by a
reasonable number of adjustments to the price of uncontrolled sales. Id § 1.4822(e)(2)(ii), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 238.
"Uncontrolled sales" include "(a) sales made by a member of the controlled group to
an unrelated party, (b) sales made to a member of the controlled group by an unrelated
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by reducing the price the controlled sale buyer obtained on resale by
the profit margin that uncontrolled distributors earn in similar transactions. 38 The cost plus method derives an arm's length price by
adding the percentage markup that uncontrolled manufacturers earn
in similar transactions to the full cost of producing the item. 39 Both
party, and (c) sales made in which the parties are not members of the controlled group
and are not related to each other." Id § 1.482-2(e)(2)(ii), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218,
236.
38. The resale price method establishes an arm's length price by determining the
price that the controlled sale buyer has or would have obtained on resale, called the
"applicable resale price," and by reducing it by an appropriate markup. Id § 1.4822(e)(3)(i), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 237.
The applicable resale price is the price "at which it is anticipated" that the buyer in the
controlled sale will resell the property in an uncontrolled sale. Id § 1.482-2(e)(3)(iv),
T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 239. If the property is involved in controlled resales, the
applicable resale price is the price "at which such property is finally resold in an uncontrolled sale . . . ." Id § 1.482-2(e)(3)(v), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 239. (Note the
anomalous difference in tenses between the two descriptions of an uncontrolled resale.)
"The 'applicable resale price' will generally be equal to either the price at which current
resales of the same property are being made or the resale price of the particular item of
property involved." Id at § 1.482-2(e)(3)(iv), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 239.
The regulation defines the "appropriate markup percentage" in terms of the uncontrolled transaction "most similar" to the sale under scrutiny in which a buyer bought and
resold property in uncontrolled transactions. Id § 1.482-2(e)(vi), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B.
218, 239-40. The appropriate markup percentage is the gross profit that the buyerreseller or another party earned in similar uncontrolled resales divided by the prices
obtained in these resales. Id "Whenever possible" the markup percentage should come
from similar purchases and resales that the controlled sale buyer has made with
independent parties. Id § 1.482-2(e)(3)(vii), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 240. The regulation stresses four factors for assessing the similarity of resales: first, the type of property
involved; second, the functions the reseller performs with respect to the property; third,
the effect the reseller's intangible property, e.g., patents and trademarks, has on the price
of the property resold; and fourth, the reseller's geographic market. Id § 1.4822(e)(3)(vi), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 239-40.
In sum, under the resale price method, the formula for deriving the arm's length price,
before adjusting for the material differences, is as follows: applicableresalepriceminus
appropriatemarkup is equal to arm's length price, when the appropriatemarkup is equal
to applicableresaleprice multiplied by apprapriatemarkup percentage. See infra note 42
and accompanying text concerning adjustments for material differences.
39. The cost plus method obtains an arm's length price by adding an appropriate
gross profit to the cost of producing the item. Id § 1.482-2(e)(4)(i), T.D. 6952, 1968-1
C.B. 218, 241.
An appropriate gross profit is the cost of producing the property involved as multiplied
by an "appropriate gross profit percentage." Id The appropriate gross profit percentage
is the gross profit the seller or another party earned in similar, uncontrolled sales divided
by the cost of producing the items in these sales. Id § 1.482-2(e)(4)(iii), T.D. 6952, 19681 C.B. 218, 241. The regulation mandates that the Service compute the costs of producing the items in question by apportioning costs "in accordafice with sound accounting
practices .... which neither favor a nor burden [ controlled sales in comparison with
uncontrolled sales." Id § 1A82-2(e)(4)(ii), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 241. The cost
plus method should use "whenever possible" gross profit percentages from similar sales
the controlled sale seller has made with independent parties. Id § 1.482-2(e)(4)(iv), T.D.
6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 242. For assessing the similarity of sales, the regulation stresses
four characteristics that parallel the factors for assessing the similarity of resales under
the resale price method, supra note 38. Compareid § 1.482-2(e)(4)(iii), T.D. 6952, 19681 C.B.218, 241 (cost plus method) with id § 1.482-2(e)(3)(vi), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218,
239-40 (resale price method).
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the resale price method and the cost plus method use gross, not net,

profit margins to derive an arm's length price.40 The comparable
uncontrolled price method avoids using profit margins by using only

the market prices obtained in comparable sales. All three methods
require the Service to make adjustments to reflect "material differences" 4 1 between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions under
comparison. 42 Finally, if the taxpayer can establish that another
method "is clearly more appropriate," or if none of the three methods is reasonably applicable, the Service can vary these methods or
use some other method, 43 informally called the fourth method. 44
In sum, under the cost plus method, the formula for deriving the arm's length price,
before adjasting for material differences, is as follows: cost ofproducing multiplied by
[(one) plus grossproftpercentage] is equal to arm's length price). See infra note 42 and
accompanying text concerning adjustments for material differences.
40. The resale price method uses the controlled sale buyer's or another party's gross
profit margin; the appropriate markup percentage is "equal to the percentage of gross
profit (expressed as a percentage of sales)" the controlled sale buyer or another reseller
earns in similar, uncontrolled resales. Id § 1.482-2(e)(3)(vi), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218,
239-40; see supra note 38. The cost plus method uses the controlled sale seller's or
another party's gross profit margin; the appropriate gross profit percentage is "equal to
the gross profit percentage (expressed as a percentage of cost)" the controlled sale seller
or another seller earns in similar, uncontrolled sales. Id § 1.482-2(e)(4)(iii), T.D. 6952,
1968-1 C.B. 218, 241; see supra note 39.
House Bill 10650 would have directed the Service to consider payroll, advertising, selling, and promotional expenses when allocating under section 482-factors that affect net,
but not gross, profits. H.R. 10650, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 6 (1962), reprintedin STAFF
OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 90TH CONG., IST SEss., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF H.R. 10650, 87TH CONGRESS, THE REVENUE ACT OF 1962, PUBLIC LAW 87-834, pt. 1.

at 680-86 (Comm. Print 1967); see infra note 129. The proposal did not become law,
however. The Conference Committee report accompanying the bill stated only that
"[t]he conferees on the part of both the House and the Senate believe that the objectives
of section 6 of [House bill 10650] as passed by the House can be accomplished by amendment of the regulations under present section 482." H.R. REP. No. 2508, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 18-19 (1962), reprintedin 1962-3 C.B. 1129, 1146. See infia note 130 and accompanying text.
Net profits play only a very limited role in the present regulation. Treas. Reg. § 1.4822(e)(3)(viii). T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 240.
41. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(e)(3)(ix), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 240-41.
42. Id § 1.482-2(e)(2)(ii), (3)(ix), (4)(v), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 236, 240-42.
Material differences are those differences that "have a definite and reasonable ascertainable effect on price." Id Specific differences the regulations mention that may have this
effect include quality, the terms of sale, intangible property-such as patents and trademarks--the time of sale, market levels, and the geographic market involved. Id § 1.4822(e)(2)(ii), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 236.
43. Id § 1.482-2(e)(1)(iii), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 235. For a list of some of
these other methods that the Service has used in the past, see Feinschreiber, Intercompany
PricingRules Show Needfor Revision, 51 TAxES 133, 136-37 (1973).
44. E.g., E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 608 F.2d 445, 452 (Ct. Cl.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 962 (1980); M. DUERR, supra note 4, at 24; Seghers,
Intercompany Pricing-TaxAudits, 5 INT'L TAX J. 437, 438, 440 (1979).
Many articles have explained the mechanics of section 1.482-2(e) of the regulation.
E.g., Bischel, supra note 5, at 493-99; Fuller, supra note 27, at 505-11; Jenks, supra note
27, at 306-12; Rothkopf, supra note 5, at 731-34; Surrey, supra note 10, at 77-78; Comment, supra note 5, at 224-27. For an article concerning the accounting aspects of section
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In Du Pont, the Government 4s used two methods not specified
in the regulation to justify the Service's allocation.4 6 Du Pont argued
that, because the resale price method applied under the circumstances, the regulation precluded the Service from using any other
method to allocate income to Du Pont, and moreover, that Du Pont
47
could justify its prices to DISA under the resale price method.
First, Du Pont noted that DISA's gross profit margin 48 for 1960
was well within the range of gross profit margins of those companies

the Service had used to determine the Service's 1960 allocation to Du
Pont.4 9 The court concluded, however, that these other companies

were not comparable to DISA and that the Service's use of these
companies' statistics did not mean that "the Service must have considered these drug and chemical wholesalers as comparable companies making similar resales." 50
Second, Du Pont argued that the Government's evidence supported Du Pont's prices to DISA when analyzed under the resale
price method. To justify the Service's allocation, the Government
had randomly selected six management consulting firms, five advertising agencies, and twenty-one distributors-firms that performed
the three kinds of functions that DISA had performed.5 ' Du Pont
noted, however, that DISA's gross profit margin52 was well within
the range of gross profit margins realized by the twenty-one distributors whose figures the Government had introduced as evidence

against Du Pont.53 The trial judge54 had found that, of the three
types of companies, the twenty-one distributors performed functions
1.482-2(e) of the regulation, see Kalish, Intercompanypricing: how to handle an internationaltax examination, 9 TAx ADVISOR 196 (1978).
45. The United States Justice Department represents the Service in cases appearing
before the Court of Claims. 28 U.S.C. § 518 (1976), amended by 28 U.S.C.A. § 518(a)
(West Supp. 1982).
46. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
47. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
48. The gross profit margin is equal to the resale price less the price at which the
reseller purchased the goods from the manufacturer. 78-1 U.S. TAX CAS. (CCH) 9374,
at 83,968 (finding 123).
49. DISA's gross profit margin for 1960 was 26%. Twenty-one percent was the average gross profit margin of the companies whose statistics the Service had used in allocating income for 1960. These companies' gross profit margins ranged from 9 to 33%. 608
F.2d at 452. The Service had used these companies' net profit figures, however. 1d
50. Id at 452. Whether or not the court correctly handled this argument, one should
note that the courts seem to uphold section 482 allocations even though derived by an
unreasonable method, so long as at trial, the Service can justify the amount under the
regulation and the taxpayer cannot show that the amount is unreasonable. See generally
Jenks, Procedurallssuesin Section 482 Cases, 25 TAX LAW. 499 (1972); infra note 146 and
accompanying text.
51. 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9374, at 83,966 (finding 118).
52. See infra note 75.
53. 607 F.2d at 451-52. For the trial judge's supportive finding, see 78-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) 1 9374, at 83,967-68 (finding 123).
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most similar to DISA's functions,

55

and that DISA's gross profit

margin was well within the range of gross profit normally realized by
independent operators buying merchandise for resale."' 56 The Court

of Claims, however, concluded that the twenty-one distributors were
not comparable to DISA. The court presumed that "what a business

spends to provide services is a reasonable indication of the magnitude of these services."'57 Because DISA's selling expenses were
much lower than those of six of the distributors whose services were

most like DISA's, the court could not "view these six companies as
having made resales similar to DISA's.

' 58

Here the court closely

reviewed the data, not to make adjustments in order to obtain a
proper allocation, but to reject data from similar transactions.
The "court was less demanding when it reviewed the Government's evidence. In contrast to the narrow reading of the regulation

and close evidentiary scrutiny by which it rejected Du Pont's case,
the court began its review of the Government's case by remarking
that the derivation of "realistic intercompany prices is hardly.

. .

an

economic art susceptible of precision. A 'broad brush' approach to
this inexact field seems necessary. . . -59 The court then gave its
approval to the two ad hoc methods the Government had used to

justify the Commissioner's allocation.60
First, as noted, the Government had introduced data from six
management consulting firms, five advertising agencies, and twentyone distributors-firms that performed the three kinds of functions
that DISA had performed. The Government had shown that the

54. The Court of Claims has fifteen trial judges, or commissioners, who write opinions reporting findings of fact and recommending conclusions of law. 17 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4101, at 201 (1978); see
28 U.S.C. § 2503(a) (1976).
55. 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9374, at 83,967-68 (finding 123).
56. 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9374, at 83,909. The trial judge rejected Du Pont's
argument, only because Du Pont had not adjusted its prices to DISA in order to take into
account DISA's lack of risk. Id at 83,910.
57. 608 F.2d at 452. The trial judge also made this presumption. 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9374, at 83,966 (finding 118).
58. 608 F.2d at 452.
Before the trial judge, Du Pont also attempted to establish the applicability of the
resale price method by introducing evidence of agreements between parties dealing at
arm's length in which the profit split between the manufacturers and distributors was
comparable to the split between Du Pont and DISA. 78-I U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9374,
at 83,954-61 (findings 103, 105-11). Du Pont also provided expert testimony that the
profit split between Du Pont and DISA was comparable to a split between parties dealing
at arm's length. Id at 83,952-55 (findings 102 & 104). The trial judge found that the
agreements between the unrelated parties were materially different from the Du PontDISA arrangement, id at 83,954-61 (findings 103, 105-11), and that the factual assumptions underlying the expert opinions did not correspond to the facts of the Du Pont-DISA
arrangement, id at 83,952-55 (findings 102 & 104).
59. 608 F.2d at 455.
60. Id at 456.
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three groups of firms had much lower ratios of net profits 6' over sales
for the years 1967 to 197262 than DISA had had for the years 1959
and 1960.63 Note that the twenty-one distributors are the same distributors the court found were not comparable to DISA when Du

Pont used them for comparison. 64 Second, the Government calculated the average after-tax rate of return 65 for 1,133 companies using

data that Standard & Poor's had compiled for the years 1960 to
1969.66 DISA's rate of return far exceeded those of all the 1,133
67
companies.
The basic dispute in the case was that Du Pont relied on the
resale price method, whereas the Government created its own meth-

ods. The Service specifically designed the resale price method to
cover situations like Du Pont's, in which "a foreign distributing affiliate acquires property from a United States manufacturing affiliate
that sells the property to third parties" without significantly affecting
the property's value. 68 The regulation provides, "The resale price
method must be used . . .if

. .

. (a),[t]here are no comparable

uncontrolled sales . . . (b) [a]n applicable resale price [here the
actual resale price in Europe] . . .is available," and the buyer has
not added substantially to the property's value before resale.6 9 The

uncontested facts of Du Pont showed that all these conditions
61. Net profits are equal to gross income less total operating costs. 78-1 U.S. TAX
CAs. (CCH) 9374, at 83,966 (finding 119). Compareinfra note 75 (gross profit margin).
62. 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9374, at 83,966 (finding 118).
63. For the five years in question, the average ratio of gross income to total operating
costs was 108.3% for the management consulting firms; 123.9% for the five advertising
agencies; and 129.3% for the 21 distributors. For DISA, this ratio in 1959 was 281.5%
before and 108.6% after the Service's allocation, and in 1960, it was 397.1% before and
179.3% after the allocation. 608 F.2d at 456; 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)1 9374, at 83,96668 (findings 118-24).
64. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
65. The trial court defined rate of return as the ratio obtained by dividing "after-tax
net income plus interest paid" by the company's "total capital base." 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9374, at 83,969-70 (findings 132 & 133). The court justified using after-tax profits on the grounds that "net income ... paid out for taxes is not available to the owners
of the business." Id at 83,969. The court's view, however, is incorrect. The purpose of
the regulation is not to find how much income businesses have available after taxes; it is
to find how much income a reseller receives in an arm's length transaction. Many factors
unrelated to the market, such as depreciation or tax credits, affect a company's after-tax
income. Thus, it is an unnecessary distortion to use after-tax net income in computing
the rate of return. As the Tax Court judge in U.S. Steel noted: "[A]ny rate of return on
cost should not-reflect income taxes, either hypothetical or actual, which might apply to
the resulting income. The amount of taxes due would depend on varying factors, peculiar to the corporate organization and activities .... ." United States Steel Corp. v.
Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH)586, 604 (1977), rev'd, 617 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1980).
66. 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)1 9374 at 83,969-71 (findings 130-37).
67. Id at 83,971 (finding 138).
68. Rothkopf, supra note 5, at 733; accord Surrey, supra note 10, at 77.
69. The regulation provides in full as follows:
The resale price method must be used to compute an arm's length price of a
controlled sale if all the following circumstances exist:
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existed.70 The resale price method derives the arm's length price by

using the "most similar" uncontrolled sale.71 The regulation allows
a similar uncontrolled sale for use
considerable flexibility in finding
72
under the resale price method.
Flexibility is necessary, because it can be difficult to find similar

uncontrolled transactions. In 1968, Stanley Surrey, then the Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy, wrote that "tax allocation
problems . . . demand a coherent and thought-through set of
answers, rather than a seat-of-the-pants, 'let's decide each case on its
facts' approach. '73 An overly strict reading of the requirement of

similarity would deprive taxpayers of the regulation's protection.
Nevertheless, the Du Pont court held that the regulation requires
(a) There are no comparable uncontrolled sales as defined in subparagraph
(2) of this paragraph.
(b) An applicable resale price, as defined in subdivision (iv) or (v) of this
subparagraph, is available with respect to resales made within a reasonable time
before or after the time of the controlled sale.
(c) The buyer (reseller) has not added more than an insubstantial amount to
the value of the property by physically altering the product before resale. For
this purpose packaging, repacking, labeling, or minor assembly of property does
not constitute physical alteration.
(a) The buyer (reseller) has not added more than an insubstantial amount to
the value of the property by the use of intangible property. See § 1.482-2(d)(3)
for the definition of intangible property.
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(e)(3)(ii), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 238.
70. First, the parties agreed that no "independent organization [was] circumstanced
as DISA was during the period in suit and performing the marketing functions that were
assigned to it by plaintiff." 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9374, at 83,952 (finding 101).
Second, neither party questioned the price DISA obtained in reselling the products in
Europe. Third, the Government stressed, without challenge from Du Pont, that "DISA
performed no functions that were beyond the overall spectrum of activity represented by
management consulting firms, advertising agencies and distributors operating in the
United States." Id at 83,966 (finding 118). In other words, DISA did not substantially
add to the value of the products by using intangible property or by physically altering
them before resale. See id at 83,945-46 (findings 90 & 91); Brief for the United States at
9, E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 608 F.2d 445 (Ct. Cl.1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 962 (1980).
71. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(e)(3)(vi), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 239-40.
72. The item in the similar uncontrolled sale need not bear a close physical similarity
to the item in the controlled sale; prevailing markup percentages for the industry are
appropriate when the markup percentages of particular sales or groups of sales are
unavailable; and markup percentages for resales in the United States are acceptable
when resale markups in the foreign market are unavailable. Id § 1.482-2(e)(3)(vi)-(vii),
T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 239-40. For instance, the resale price method permits the use
of markup percentages from uncontrolled sales of electric toasters in determining an
arm's length price for controlled sales of electric mixers. Id § 1A82-2(e)(3)(ix), T.D.
6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 240-41. The regulation also permits the use of "reasonable statistical sampling techniques." Id § 1.482-2(e)(1)(iv), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 235.
At the time of the regulation's issuance, senior Treasury Department officials stressed
flexible application. E.g., Cohen (1968), supra note 10, at 74 ("Legitimate shortcuts, such
as application of pricing methods to product lines, and application of average departmental overhead rates, will be recognized"); Cohen (1967), supra note 10, at 237.
73. Surrey, supra note 10, at 76.
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"substantial comparability" 74 under the resale price method.

Further, Du Pont used gross profit under the resale price
method whereas the Government's methods were based on net
profit. 75 The methods the regulation specifies for determining the
arm's length price are based on gross profit.76 Thus, the regulation

the Government's, method of comtends to support Du Pont's, not
77
puting the arm's length price.

The court made a concerted effort to interpret the regulation
narrowly against Du Pont, yet gave the Service broad discretion. Du
Pont used the gross profit margins of companies that the Govern-

ment introduced as evidence to justify its arm's length prices. 78 The

court rejected Du Pont's evidence based on a presumption which the
court applied to some of the companies being compared. 79 Yet the
Government's evidence, which the court approved, was based

largely on the same twenty-one companies that the Government had
used to justify its allocation.8 0

Moreover, the court rejected Du

Pont's analysis which used the same companies the examining agent
used to calculate his allocation. The court reasoned that the agent
may have been wrong to consider the other companies as comparable. 8 ' As such, the court's holding severely emasculates any protection the regulation offers businesses and fortifies the Service's
already broad discretion.
A primary factor in the court's decision was that Du Pont
clearly tried 82 to set its prices without regard to market conditions in
74. 608 F.2d at 451.
75. Gross profit equals sales revenue minus the cost of goods sold, where cost of
goods sold is the direct cost of producing the good (the aggregate of all material, labor,
and overhead costs). The gross profit margin percentage equals the gross profit divided
by sales revenue. Net profit equals sales revenue minus all direct and indirect costs of
producing the goods, including selling and administrative expenses, interest, and taxes.
The net profit margin percentage equals net profit divided by sales revenue. Net profit,
therefore, equals gross profit minus selling and administrative expenses, interest, and
taxes. See generally, S. MATULICH & L. HEITGER, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 229-30
(1980).
Under the regulations, the Service should use gross profit figures to calculate arm's
length prices under the resale-price and cost plus methods. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. The regulation permits the use of net sales under the resale price method
only "if the comparable markup percentage is based upon net sales." Treas. Reg.
§ 1A82-2(e)(3)(viii), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 240. Seesupra note 38 and accompanying text for a description of how to calculate the arm's length price for the resale price
method.
76. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
82. Du Pont had designed its pricing policy to leave DISA with 75% of the total
profits. Yet Du Pont failed to account for some intercorporate transfers, so that the
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order to minimize its United States income taxes.83 Early in its
opinion, the court noted that it mentioned evidence of Du Pont's
arrangement with DISA, "not as direct proof. . .[to support] the
Commissioner's reallocation," but rather to suggest why the Commissioner could not compare Du Pont's sales to DISA with any
unrelated-party sales.84 Yet Du Pont's arrangement with DISA
clearly influenced the court's decision: "[t]hat some reallocation was
reasonable is demonstrated by recalling the facts of DISA's operation." 85 Moreover, the court all but admitted that, under the regulations, Du Pont might be able to justify DISA's profit: "it would have
been undiluted luck-which under the regulation it probably could
enjoy-if [Du Pont] had managed to discover comparable resales
falling within the resale price method as set forth in the regulation
(including adjustments to be made [for material differences]). 8 6
Although the court may have reached a correct result in the particular case, it could have achieved the same result without establishing a damaging precedent. The court noted that Du Pont priced its
products to DISA in order "to insulate DISA from any loss."87 The
court could have upheld the Service's allocation on the ground that
DISA's lack of market risk materially differed from uncontrolled
transactions,8 8 and that Du Pont offered no evidence to rebut this
showing. Instead, by being so receptive to Service discretion at a
time when the Service has been applying section 482 without close
regard to the regulations, 89 the DuPont case creates a damaging precedent. True, the taxpayer in Du Pont deliberately tried to lessen its
tax liability.90 But by stating that Du Pont's motives did not affect
the result, the court's interpretation of the regulations could also
actual division of profits between Du Pont and DISA during the years in question was
approximately 501-50%. 608 F.2d at 448; 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9374, at 83,941
(finding 79).
83. "Instead of allowing each individual producing department to value its goods
economically and to set a realistic price, Du Pont left pricing on the sales to DISA with
[Du Pont's tax planning and legal departments].... [No economic correlation of costs
to prices was attempted." 608 F.2d at 448. (footnotes omitted). "Du Pont's prices to
DISA were deliberately set high and with little or no regard to economic realities." Id at
455. "[W]e think it... undeniable that the tax advantages of such a foreign entity were
also an important, though not the primary, consideration in DISA's creation and operation." Id at 447. "On the whole, the pricing system was based solely on [the Du Pont]
Treasury and Legal Department estimates of the greatest amount of profits that would be
shifted to DISA without evoking IRS intervention." Id at 448 (footnote omitted).
84. Id at 449.
85. Id at 455.
86. Id at 454 (italics added).
87. Id at 448.
88. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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apply to corporations acting in good faith. 9 1
B.

THE U.S. STEEL CASE

In 1949, the United States Steel Corporation formed Orinoco
Mining Company, a wholly owned corporation, to mine large92deposOriits of iron ore that U.S. Steel had discovered in Venezuela.
noco, which was incorporated in Delaware, was subject to
Venezuela's maximum tax of fifty percent on net income.93 Orinoco
was also subject to United States income tax, but the United States
foreign tax credit 94 offset this amount. 95 U.S. Steel bought the ore
96
from Orinoco F.O.B. Puerto Ordaz.

Initially, U.S. Steel contracted with independent shipping companies to transport the ore to the United States. 97 In 1953, U.S. Steel
formed Navios, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary, to transport the ore
for it.98 Navios, a Liberian corporation, was subject to a 2.5 percent
Venezuelan excise tax and was exempt from United States income
taxes. 99 Although U.S. Steel was Navios's primary customer, it
charged other customers the same price it charged U.S. Steel. 1°°

U.S. Steel set Navios's shipping charge to equal the difference
Ordaz and the market
between the price of iron ore F.O.B. Puerto
101
States.
United
the
in
ore
iron
for
price
U.S. Steel's investment in Navios was $50,000.102 By the end of
1960, Navios had accumulated "nearly $80 million in cash and cash
91. Information about a taxpayer's motivations should be irrelevant in determining
whether a taxpayer could justify its prices. There is some support for this position:
No amount of self-examination of the taxpayer's internal transactions alone
could make it possible to know what prices or terms unrelated parties would
have charged or demanded. We think it palpable that, if the standard set by
these unquestioned regulations is to be met, evidence of transactions between
uncontrolled corporations unrelated to [the taxpayer] must be adduced in order
to determine what charge would have been negotiated for the performance of
• ..services [for the related entity].
Lufkin Foundary & Mach. Co. v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 805, 808 (5th Cir. 1972).
92. United States Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, 617 F.2d 942, 945 (2d Cir. 1980).
93. Id
94. See id; I.R.C. § 901 (1976).
95. 617 F.2d at 945.
96. Id
97. See id; United States Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 586, 591
(1977), rev'd, 617 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1980).
98. 617 F.2d at 945. Navios did not own any vessels. Instead, it chartered vessels
from the companies that previously had shipped the ore for U.S. Steel. 1d
99. See id
100. Id; see infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
101. 617 F.2d at 945. Another U.S. Steel subsidiary, Oliver Mining Company, mined
ore in the Mesabi range in Minnesota. An annual auction for Mesabi ore set the "Lower
Lake Erie" price, a well-known and widely quoted price for iron ore in the United States.
See id; 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 588.
102. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 591.
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equivalents"' 1 3 but had not paid any dividends to U.S. Steel.'1 4 The
Service used section 482 to allocate $52 million of Navios's income
to U.S. Steel for the period 1957 to 1960,105 and U.S. Steel chal-

lenged this allocation in the Tax Court. Although the court found
that the Service "may have been 'heavy handed' in [its] allocation,"16 it held that some allocation was justified. 0 7 Using a com-

plicated procedure to arrive at an arm's length charge for Navios's
services, 08 the court then allocated $27 million of Navios' income to
U.S. Steel.109
The Second Circuit reversed on appeal. 110 U.S. Steel had
showed that Navios charged independent companies the same price
that it charged U.S. Steel to deliver ore to the United States."
Moreover, the aggregate amount charged to independent companies
compris~d five percent of Navios's income during the years under
scrutiny." 2 The Government made two arguments to rebut this
showing. First, it argued that if U.S. Steel, a long-term charterer,
had been dealing with Navios at arm's length, it would have
obtained a lower rate than these short-term charterers. 113 Second,
the Government argued that Navios's charge for shipping ore from
Venezuela to its other customers in Great Britain was significantly
than
lower when computed on the basis of distance travelled
4
Navios's charge for shipping ore to the United States."
103. 617 F.2d at 945.
104. See id
105. 617 F.2d at 946; 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 601.
106. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 602.
107. Id at 604.
108. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
109. 36 T.C.M. (CCII) at 605.
110. See 617 F.2d at 944.
111. See id at 948.
112. Id at 946. The five percent figure represented $20 million of Navios's total gross
revenue from shipping to the eastern United States. Id at 945-46.
113. Id at 948-49. The court flatly rejected this argument. First, the court noted that
a shipowner might not want to risk locking itself into a long-term rate. Second, the court
stressed that Navios's relationship with U.S. Steel was as a carrier, not as a charterer.
Thus, the Service's "analogy" to a charterer was unpersuasive. Id at 949. Yet even as a
carrier Navios would prefer having long-term customers. Traditionally, courts required
a taxpayer to prove that the Service's allocation was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable before overturning the Service's allocation. See infra note 146 and accompanying
text. The Government's evidence should have been enough to show that the amount of
the Service's allocation was not arbitrary.
114. 617 F.2d at 949. In rejecting this argument, the court noted that there was nothing in the record to show that charter rates would be an arithmetic multiple of the distance travelled, or to show what the marginal cost of deliveries to Britain were. The
Service had suggested that Navios could set higher rates for its ore deliveries to the
United States than for its ore deliveries to Europe, because of the different selling prices
for ore in the two markets. The court responded that just because "sellers of ore, providers of ore transport, and ore buyers were all influenced by the price of a competing product does not mean that a price is not an arm's length price." Id
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The Second Circuit's decision demonstrates a flexible reading of

the regulation. Relying on that part of the regulation governing
service charges, the court rejected both of the Government's argu-

ments infavor of U.S. Steel's evidence. 115 The regulation provides
that "an arm's length charge for services rendered shall be the
amount which was charged or would have been charged for the same

or similar services in independent transactions with or between unrelated parties under similar circumstances considering all relevant
facts."' 1 6 Courts generally require a taxpayer to prove that the Service's allocation was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable before it
will even consider altering the allocation. 117 The Second Circuit

interpreted the regulation under section 482, however, as "insulating" the-taxpayer from a section 482 allocation whenever the taxpayer can establish that, based on "independent transactions with or
between unrelated parties," its service charges were at arm's
length.11 8 Because the court found that the taxpayer had satisfied
this test, it required the Service to prove that Navios's prices "deviated from a market price."'

9

Moreover, the court rejected the Gov-

ernment's argument that the regulation's language allowing for
consideration of "all relevant facts" required a determination of
whether "Navios's prices were the result of a perfectly competitive
market."' 20 Instead, the court found that the regulation calls for a
"limited approach":121 once the taxpayer proves it made independent transactions with unrelated parties at the same price as it did in
115. Id at 949-51.
116. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(b)(3), T.D. 6998, 1969-1 C.B. 144, 144. In general, the regulation deems an arm's length charge for services performed as "equal to the costs or
deductions [the renderer] incurred" in performing the service. Id If, however, the
intercompany service is an "integral part of the business activity" of either the renderer
or the recipient, then the cost or deduction standard of § 1.482-2(b)(3) does not apply.

Id
117. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
118. 617 F.2d at 950.
119. Id at 948.
120. Id at 950. The court, however, did not decide how many " 'independent transactions' at the taxpayer's price would be needed to insulate taxpayer from [.ection] 482 in a
situation where a preponderance of the 'independent' transactions take place at a price
far different from the price paid or charged by taxpayer." 1d The court reasoned that
U.S. Steel had shown that a sufficient number of independent transactions had occurred
over a long period of time, and thus, the question did not arise. Id
121. Id at 950. The court gave an example that illustrates the extent to which it
would limit its inquiry under the regulation. If all carriers and charterers in the market,
including Navios, charged the difference between Orinoco's price F.O.B. Puerto Ordaz
and the Lower Lake Erie price, and if U.S. Steel did not control Orinoco, then Navios's
price would be arm's length. But if U.S. Steel did control Orinoco and had Orinoco
undervalue its ore price, then Navios's prices would increase and, thus, would no longer
be arm's length, because U.S. Steel, through Orinoco, would have affected it. Even in
this situation, however, the court refused to look beyond proof that Navios charged unrelated parties the same price that it charged U.S. Steel, since this would distort "the kind
of inquiry the Regulations direct us to undertake." Id at 949.
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controlled transactions, the court's inquiry is over, and it should

dissallow the Service's allocation.
The Du Pont and U.S. Steel cases represent fundamentally different views on how to interpret section 482 and the regulation. The
Du Pont case interpreted the regulation narrowly and to the taxpayer's disadvantage; U.S. Steel interpreted the regulation flexibly to
confine the Service's discretion in section 482 allocations. Du Pont
imposed an onerous burden of production on the taxpayer; U.S.
Steel allowed the taxpayer easily to overcome a presumption that
the Service was correct. Du Pont interpreted the regulation to give
the Service broad discretion in its section 482 allocation; U.S. Steel
used the regulation to protect the taxpayer from the Service's allocation. This Note attempts to show that the U.S. Szeel case represents
a better application of the regulation. The Treasury Department
issued the regulation to protect taxpayers from unreasonable Service
allocations and from double taxation of income from foreign operations.1 22 Service agents, however, frequently allocate based on methods other than those the regulation sets out, 123 and the Service is
protected by a very favorable burden of production when taxpayers
attempt to overcome Service allocations in court.1 24 Courts should
interpret the regulation so that, whenever possible, the Service
abides by the methods that the regulation prescribes.

II
PROBLEMS IN APPLYING THE REGULATION
For over fifty years the Internal Revenue Code has provided for
income allocation among related taxpayers.1 25 Until 1968, however,
Moreover, the court refused to examine the possible reasons why some purchasers used
other carriers to ship the ore they purchased from Orinoco. The Tax Court, after noting
that Bethlehem Steel did not use Navios to ship Orinoco-purchased ore, commented,
"[p]resumably, Bethlehem found that it could do the job for less." 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at
602. The Second Circuit dismissed the Tax Court's observation as "irrelevant" to an
inquiry under § 482. 617 F.2d at 950. If Navios could charge independent buyers a
higher price than other companies charged for comparable services, that was beyond the
court's scrutiny: "the test of 'independence'. . . [does not] require that the transaction
be one unaffected by the market power of the taxpayer." Id
122. See supra notes 20-22 and infra notes 132-40 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 482 (1976); Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 45, 45 Stat 791, 806
(1927-29) (repealed 1939); Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 240(f), 44 Stat. 9, 46 (1925-27)
(repealed 1939); Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 240(d), 42 Stat. 227, 260 (1921-23)
(repealed 1924); Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 240, 40 Stat. 1057, 1082 (1917-19)
(repealed 1921). Section 482 is substantially the same as section 45 of the 1928 Act. H.R.
REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A165 (1954), reprintedin 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4017,4304; S. REp. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 310 (1954), reprintedin 1954
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4621, 4949.
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both the statute and the regulations promulgated thereunder were
worded very generally. They furnished little practical guidance to
taxpayer companies in dealing with their affiliates. 126 Courts also
had trouble interpreting the provisions. They applied different, often
conflicting, standards in determining a proper allocation among
27
related taxpayers.
In the 1960's, the Government became concerned that United
States corporations were selling goods to overseas subsidiaries at
artificially low prices "to avoid a U.S. tax on what should be [the
domestic company's] full profit for such sales."' 128 In 1962, the
House of Representatives passed an amendment to section 482
which listed objective factors for the Service to consider when allocating income arising from sales of tangible-property between related
foreign and domestic corporations. 129 The House-Senate Conference Committee deleted that amendment, and instead invited the
Treasury Department to issue regulations to provide "additional
guidelines and formulas for the allocation of income and deductions
James Fuller credits Regulation 41, arts. 77, 78 (1918) under the War Revenue Act of
1917 as the earliest predecessor of section 482. Fuller, supra note 27, at 475.
126. Regulations under early predecessors of Section 482 did little more than echo the
statute's wording. Compare, e.g., Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 240(), 44 Stat. 9, 46
(1926) (repealed 1928) with Treas. Reg. 69, art. 636 (1926), T.D. 3922, 28 Treas. Dec. Int.
Rev. 558, 741 (1927); Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 240(d), 42 Stat. 227, 260 (1921)
(repealed 1926) with Treas. Reg. 62, art. 637 (1924), T.D. 3295, 24 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev.
207, 389 (1922). The regulations under the Revenue Acts of 1928 and 1932 included no
provision interpreting section 45. [1936] 1 STAND. FED. TAX SERV. (CCH) 435.01.
The 1934 regulations provided that a controlled taxpayer's true income should be
determined according to the standard of "an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's
length with another uncontrolled taxpayer." Treas. Reg. 86, art. 45-1 (1934), BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, REGULATIONS 86 RELATING TO THE
INCOME TAX UNDER THE REVENUE AcT OF 1934, at 123 (1935), reprinted in [1935] 1
STAND. FED. TAX SERV. (CCH) I 435A.
Succeeding regulations continued to prescribe the same standard. See, e.g., Treas.
Reg. 101, art. 45-1 (1938), 4 Fed. Reg. 616, 680 (1939); Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.45-1 (1953),
18 Fed. Reg. 5771, 5886-87 (1953); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (1962), T.D. 6595, 1962-1 C.B.
43, 49-51.
127. See supra note 29.
128. H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1962), reprintedin 1962-3 C.B. 405,
432.
129. H.R. 10650, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1962). The bill provided that when making
allocations between related foreign and domestic taxpayers, the Service should consider
among other factors the location of the tangible property used in the operation, the
source of payroll funds attributable to the operation, and the source of funds for advertising, selling, and promotional expenses. The bill also included special rules for valuing
the assets involved, for treating foreign taxes paid, for allocating sales commissions, and
for adjusting for material differences in quantity, marketing conditions, import duties,
and transportation costs. Id See also H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-30
(1962), reprintedin 1962-3 C.B. 405, 432-34.
Kauder reports that corporations objected to this amendment primarily because
(1) they doubted that accurate allocations of net income based on location of property
were possible, and (2) they believed that the general arm's length standard offered greater
protection. See Kauder, supra note 6, at 31.
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in cases involving foreign income."' 130 The Treasury Department
responded by proposing regulations in 1965 and 1966, and issuing a
final regulation in 1968.'31 The regulation furnished detailed guidance for various types of section 482 allocations, not necessarily
involving international transactions.
The Treasury Department intended the regulation to "provide
as much guidance as possible to taxpayers and Internal Revenue
Agents as to the standards to be applied in the administration of the
section."' 32 The Treasury Department wanted to allow businesses to
"achieve . .. stability in business planning and arrangements."' 133

With these goals in mind the regulation created safe havens, such
that, if the price that a taxpayer charges its affiliate is within a specified m"
argin, the Service will accept the transaction as being at arm's
length.'34

The Treasury Department did not create safe havens for all categories of intercompany transactions.135 It specifically avoided safe
havens for intercompany sales of tangible goods because such transactions encompass a wide variety of business practices, factual patterns, and market situations. Any mechanical formula "would

1 36
produce arbitrary results far removed from economic reality."'

The regulation instead defined three specific methods for calculating
an acceptable arm's length price. The regulation specifies an order
of priority, so that "a taxpayer is protected from an arbitrary choice
137
of method by the examining Agent."'
The Treasury Department stressed that it would enforce the
new regulation in "a spirit of reasonableness,"' 138 taking an "objective, even-sided approach to [the] guidelines."' 139 When the Service
issued the regulation, Internal Revenue Commissioner Cohen promised that, "[iun reviewing transactions, every reasonable effort will be
130. H.R. REP. No. 2508, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1962), reprintedin 1962-3 C.B. 1129,
1146-47. See supra note 40.
131. Treas. Reg. § 1.482, 26 C.F.R. § 1.482 (1981); Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.482, 31
Fed. Reg. 10,394 (1966); Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.482, 30 Fed. Reg. 4256 (1965).
132. Rothkopf, supra note 5, at 728. "In general, the principle was to provide as much
certainty and precision in the Regulations as was feasible within the framework of the
statute and the appropriate policy and administrative considerations." ld
133. Surrey, supra note 10, at 76.
134. [1968] 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6740. See also Cohen (1968), supra
note 10, at 73; Rothkopf, supra note 5, at 728. The taxpayer is not confined to a safe
haven if he can show that his transactions meet the arm's length standard outside the safe
haven. Surrey, supra note 10, at 78.
135. Cohen (1968), supra note 10, at 73; Rothkopf, supra note 5, at 732.
136. Rothkopf, supra note 5, at 732.
137. Surrey, supra note 10, at 77.
138. Cohen (1968), supra note 10, at 74; Cohen (1967), supra note 10, at 237; [1968] 7
STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6740. See also Surrey, supra note 10, at 77.
139. Surrey, supra note 10, at 76.
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made by Agents to find the prevailing price or profit in comparable
uncontrolled transactions, as opposed to choosing a figure at the
140
extreme end of a range of figures."
The Service, however, often appears to ignore the regulation,
particularly the subsection dealing with intercompany sales of tangible goods. That subsection sets out three specific methods to be
applied in all but extreme cases; 141 yet studies of Service allocations
consistently show that the Service applies the fourth, catchall
method, more often than it applies any of the first three. 42 The
manual relied upon by examining agents when making section 482
allocations fails to mention the regulation's first three methods.
Instead, it advises agents to apply an ad hoc "functional analysis" to
the transactions in question.143 Critics of the Service claim that the
Service often knowingly disregards the regulation,'" and several
court decisions reveal instances where the examining agent's original
allocation was based on an arbitrary method.145
140. Cohen (1968), supra note 10, at 74; Cohen (1967), supra note 10, at 237.

141. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
143. See 1 INTERNAL

REVENUE MANUAL-AUDIT

(CCH) ch. 4233 [523.2], at 7281-61

(April, 1981).
This functional analysis allocates income based on the "economic value" attributable
to the "economically significant functions" involved in the transaction under scrutiny.
An economically significant function can be attributable to personnel activities, for
example, or capital, such as patents and other intangibles. Id ch. 4233 [523.2(2)-(4)], at
7281-62. This method presumes that section 482 allocations should be based on the relative contributions made by the parties involved in an uncontrolled transaction, rather
than based only on the relative market position of the buyer and seller in a controlled,
sale, which would result from the regulation's arm's length standard.
144.

E.g., PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON BUSINESS TAXATION,

supra note 27, at 56-57;

M. DUERR, supra note 4, at 70-75; Mihaly, supra note 17, at 752 n.24.
145. United States Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 586, 602 (1977)
("At the outset, petitioner contends that the allocations made by the respondent were
'without support in the record, duplicative, inconsistent with stipulated facts, and arbitrary and capricious.' When viewed in the light of the existing record, the Court might
be inclined to agree with petitioner."), rev'd on other grounds, 617 F.2d 942 (2d Cir.
1980); Cadillac Textiles, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 295, 305 (1975) ("While
the court agrees that some allocation is fully warranted, in our opinion the method followed by the [Service] can best be described as 'heavy handed.' ") In American Terrazzo
Strip Co. v. Commissioner, the examining agent testified at trial:
Well, I can just sit back and say that it appeared to me that twenty percent
profit, net profit on an operation such as this was more than reasonable. I
figured if the taxpayer were willing to accept thai, I thought we would be getting
away with a very good deal, and if not, he would prove otherwise, and he never
proved otherwise.
American Terrazzo Strip Co. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 961, 971 n.7 (1971), acq. in, 19732 C.B. 1.
Courts have found the examining agent's method unreasonable in a number of cases.
See Eli Lilly & Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 990, 996-97 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (per curiam)
(agent's method was arbitrary, though result was reasonable); PPG Indus. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 928, 993 (1970) (agent's reliance on Service's Source Book of Statistics of
Income, without knowing whether the companies included therein were comparable, was
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Taxpayers in section 482 cases have difficulty challenging an

agent's choice of method. In all courts, taxpayers have the initial
burden of proving that the Service's allocation was arbitrary, capri-

cious, or unreasonable.

46

In the Tax Court, once the taxpayer sus-

tains this burden, the court alone determines the proper
arbitrary and unreasonable); Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. United States, 69-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) 19269, at 84,183 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (Service acted arbitrarily in making a
total allocation), aff'dinpartandrev'dinpart,435 F.2d 182, 183 (4th Cir. 1970); Johnson
Bronze Co. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. 1542, 1556 (1965) (Service acted arbitrarily in
making a total reallocation); Ach v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114, 126 (1964) (same), a 'd,
358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966); Oil Base, Inc. v. Commissioner,
23 T.C.M. 1838, 1847 (1964), ai'd, 362 F.2d 212 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 385 U.S. 928
(1966) (same); Grenada Indus. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 231, 255_(1951) (any allocation
from Hosiery or Industries to National was arbitrary), aft'd, 202 V.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 819 (1953).
Courts in other cases have found that the Government failed to justify its allocation
when presenting its case. See, e.g., Dallas Ceramic Co. v. United States, 598 F.2d 1382,
.1388 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'g 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 19830, at 1388 (N.D. Tex. 1974);
Ross Glove Co. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 569, 605-06 (1973), acq. 1974-1 C.B. 2; Woodward Governor Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 56, 65 (1970), acq. 1971-2 C.B. 20.
146. Tax Court cases and appeals therefron Eg., Wisconsin Big Boy Corp. v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 137, 140 n.2 (7th Cir. 1971), aft'g 52 T.C. 1073 (1969); Philipp Bros.
Chems., Inc. (N.Y.) v. Commissioner, 435 F.2d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 1970), a ff'g 52 T.C. 240
(1969); Oil Base, Inc. v. Commissioner, 362 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 928 (1966), a 'g 43 T.C. 928 (1964); Ballentine Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 321
F.2d 796, 800 (4th Cir. 1963), aft'g 39 T.C. 348 (1962); Campbell County State Bank v.
Commissioner, 311 F.2d 374, 379 (8th Cir. 1963), rev'g 37 T.C. 430 (1961); Hall v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 82, 87 (5th Cir. 1961) (interpreting § 45 of 1939 Code), a.f'g 32 T.C.
390 (1959).
Boardof Tax Appeals: National Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 600, 602 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 794 (1943) (§ 45 of 1939 Code), affig 46 B.T.A. 562 (1942).
Court of Claims cases: Eg., Young & Ribicam, Inc. v. United States, 410 F.2d 1233,
1244-45 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Eli Lilly & Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 990, 997 (Ct. Cl. 1967)
(per curiam).
District court cases and appeals therefron" E.g., Engineering Sales, Inc. v. United
States, 510 F.2d 565, 569 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'g 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9211 (N.D.
Ala. 1974); Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. United States, 435 F.2d 182, 185 (7th Cir.
1970), aft'g inpartand rev'g in part 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9269 (N.D. Ill. 1969);
West Indies Transp. Co. v. Dep't of Finance, Government of the Virgin Islands, 13 V.I.
301, 319-20 (D.V.I. 1976).
Eustice claims that this burden of proof on taxpayers "gives the Service a formidable
tactical advantage in the section 482 area." Eustice, supra note 3, at 494. But cf. I
INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL-AUDrr (CCH) ch. 4233[521(5)], at 7281-59 (Aug., 1981)
("When necessary information is not obtained at the audit stage, the Service is at a most
serious disadvantage if the taxpayer takes the case to court and, indeed, may even be
forced to concede the deficiency to avoid an almost certainly adverse court decision
which would then be damaging precedent.")
For information about the burden of proof in section 482 cases, see Jenks, supra note
50, at 506-10 (1972); Lewis, supra note 29, at 63-70; Plumb & Kapp, supra note 3, at 83031 (1963); ALLOCATIONS (SEC. 482)-GENERAL COVERAGE, 327 TAX MGMT. (BNA), A23 to A-27 (1975 & Supp. 1981). For information on taxpayer's burden of proof generally, see Forman, The Burden ofProof,39 TAXES 737 (1961); Marcosson, The Burden of
Proofin Tax Cases, 29 TAXES 221 (1951); Piper & Jerge, Shfling the Burden ofProofin
Ta Court, 31 TAx LAW. 303 (1978); Whitfield & McCallum, Burden of Proofand Choice
ofForum in Tax Litigation, 20 VAND. L. REv. 1179 (1967); Comment, Burden ofProofin
Tax Litigatior Offset andEquitable Recoupment, 15 BUFFALO L. REv. 616 (1966).

228

COMrELL INTERNATIONAL L4WJOURNAL

[Vol. 15:203

allocation. 147 Neither the Service nor the taxpayer benefits from any
presumption. 148 In the Court of Claims and district courts, however,
taxpayers have the additional burden of establishing the correct allocation before they can recover.149 Some commentators challenge the
application of a burden of production that is higher in the Court of
147. Eg., W. Braun Co. v. Commissioner, 396 F.2d 264, 270 (2d Cir. 1968), rel'g 26
T.C.M. 342 (1967) (remanding case to Tax Court to determine proper allocation after
finding Commissioner's allocation arbitrary); Ross Glove Co. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.
569, 602 (1973), acq. 1974-1 C.B. 2; Cadillac Textiles, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M.
295, 306 (1975); American Terrazzo Strip Co. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 961, 973-75
(1971); Nat Harrison Assoc. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 601, 617-18, 621-22 (1964); Ach v.
Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114, 126-27 (1964), a 'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1976); Johnson Bronze Co. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. 1542, 1556
(1965); Oil Base, Inc. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. 1838, 1847 (1964), afd, 362 F.2d 212
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 928 (1966). See generally Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S.
507, 515 (1935).
148. Nat Harrison Assoc. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 601, 617-18 (1964).
149. Engineering Sales, Inc. v. United States, 510 F.2d 565, 569 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'g
74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9211 (N.D. Ala. 1974); United States Gypsum Co. v. United
States, 452 F.2d 445, 450 (7th Cir. 1971), aft'g in part andrev'g in part 304 F. Supp. 627
(N.D. 11. 1969); Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. United States, 435 F.2d 182, 185 (7th
Cir. 1970), aJ'ginpartandrevy'inpart69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9269 (N.D. I11.1969);
Eli Lilly & Co., 372 F.2d 990, 997 (Ct. Cl. 1967). See generally Wiles v. United States,
312 F.2d 574, 577 (10th Cir. 1962), ajf'g 61-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9429 (D. Kans.
1961) (taxpayer also has burden of proving facts to prove a correct allocation); Alvary v.
United Sttes, 302 F.2d 790, 795 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'g 61-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9501
(S.D.N.Y. 1961) ("Although in the Tax Court a taxpayer need only prove that a deficiency is erroneous, in a suit for a refund in the district court he must prove the amount
of the error by showing what the value was.") But cf. Ross Glove Co. v. Commissioner,
60 T.C. 569 (1973) (Government has burden of proving reasonableness of § 482 allocations if it fails to give timely notice of reliance on § 482 in trial proceedings), acq. 1974-1
C.B. 2.
The different burden of proof in district courts and the Court of Claims from that of
the Tax Court derives from dictum in Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507 (1935). Taylor
affirmed a court of appeals's decision to remand a case to the Board of Tax Appeals to
determine a proper deficiency after the court of appeals found the Commissioner's determination arbitrary. The Commissioner argued that proof of arbitrariness requires proof
that a different allocation is accurate. Taylor, in dictum, rejected the Commissioner's
argument on the ground that the case involved a deficiency claim by the Service, rather
than a refund claim by the taxpayer. The Court's reasoning, however, does not support
this distinction:
[W]here as in this case the taxpayer's evidence shows the commissioner's determination to be arbitrary and excessive, it may not reasonably be held that he is
bound to pay a tax that confessedly he does not owe, unless his evidence was
sufficient also to establish .the correct amount that lawfully might be charged
against him.
Id at 515.
In two appeals from district court cases, the Seventh Circuit held that the court may
proceed to determine a proper allocation. See United States Gypsum Co. v. United
States, 452 F.2d 445, 450 (7th Cir. 1971), a~jg inpartandrev'g inpart 304 F. Supp. 627
(N.D. Ill. 1969); Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. United States, 435 F.2d 182, 187 (4th
Cir. 1970), a 'g inpartandrev'ginpart 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9269 (N.D. 11. 1967).
For a discussion of the differing burdens of proof, see ALLOCATIONS (SEC. 482)-GENERAL COVERAGE, 327 TAx MGMT. (BNA), at A-25 to A-27.
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Claims and district courts than in the Tax Court,' 50 but the distinc-

tion has become well established.' 5 ' Thus, a taxpayer faced with this
difficult burden of production may find it impossible to overcome

even unreasonable Service allocations when no comparable transactions exist.
The higher burden of production is particularly inappropriate
when the most similar transaction is one between unrelated third
parties.' 52 Normally other companies will be unwilling to reveal

their costs, markups, or profit margins to their competitors. The
Service, however, can obtain such data from other companies and

53
require them to testify as expert witnesses under I.R.C. § 7602.1
150. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 29, at 66-69; Marcosson, supranote 146, at 222; ALLOCATIONS (SEC. 482)-GENERAL COVERAGE, 327 TAX MGMT. (BNA), supra note 146, at

A-25 to A-27.
One justification for the distinction is that the taxpayer is the plaintiff in refund suits,
and the plaintiff should prove all the essential elements of his claim. See Taylor v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 619, 620-21 (2d Cir. 1934) (L. Hand, J.), a 'dsub nom., Helvering v.
Taylor, 293 U.S. 507 (1935). Yet, once the taxpayer has shown that the Service's allocation was unreasonable, he has proved that the Service's allocation should not stand.
A second possible justification for the higher standard is that district courts lack the
time or expertise to make these adjustments on their own. Even if district courts cannot
make precise adjustments, however, they could at least reduce the allocation by some
reasonable estimate. Such an estimate would fulfill the regulation's purpose better than
would a requirement that taxpayers pay amounts they have proved to be unreasonable.
In the Du Pont case, for example, the applicable regulation provides, "[i]n determining
an arm's length price appropriate adjustment must be made to reflect any material differences. . . ." Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(e)(3)(ix), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 240-41. District courts and the Court of Claims could interpret this wording to provide that they
themselves determine a reasonable allocation if neither party can prove the precise
amount.
151. Butsee Dallas Ceramic Co. v. United States, 598 F.2d 1382, 1384, 1391 (5th Cir.
1979). There, the taxpayer received contradictory judgments in the Tax Court and the
district court based on identical facts. After affirming the Tax Court's finding that no
allocation was justified, Brittingham v. Commissioner, 598 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1979) (per
curiam), the Fifth Circuit simply reversed the district court rather than remand for additional findings. "There seems little question but that the Tax Court case and the district
court case should come out the same." 598 F.2d at 1384.
152. The Tax Section of the New York State Bar Association Committee on International Taxation recommends that the Service should be unable to use third party data
that is unavailable to taxpayers. See Simon, Section 482,41locations 46 TAXES 254, 28082 (1968).
153. Section 7602 provides:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return
where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary
of any person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary is authorized(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be
relevant or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act,
or any officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession,
custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other
person the Secretary may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary at a
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The Service also has sole access to old audits of other
corporations.

154

Courts frequently compensate for the difficulties taxpayers face
under section 482 by interpreting the regulation liberally in favor of
the taxpayer. 155 The Du Pont case is particularly damaging as precedent because it both construes the regulation narrowly and imposes
an extremely difficult burden of production on taxpayers. Under the
uncontested facts of Du Pont, the court should have applied the
resale price method to the transaction.156 That method calculates an

arm's length price based on the "most similar" uncontrolled sale
157
after adjusting for all "material differences" between the two sales.
The parties in Du Pont agreed that no independent organization had
performed the functions that DISA had performed. 58 Under those
circumstances, finding a sufficiently similar transaction and adjusting for all the material differences based solely on market information would be extremely difficult. Yet Du Pont held that the
regulation requires "substantial comparability"'159 between the two
sales even under the resale price method. 60 Du Pont also held that
taxpayers bear the burden of proving the validity of all the material
adjustments between the sales, 16 1 reasoning that "the [material]
adjustments called for . . . are integral to the determination of an
'arm's length price.' "162

The Du Pont court's interpretation of the regulation under section 482 does not comport with the regulation's intended purpose.
Provisions in the regulation and statements that senior Treasury
time and place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers,
records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be
relevant or material to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may
be relevant or material to such inquiry.

I.R.C. § 7602 (1976). See also I

INTERNAL

REVENUE

MANUAL-AUDIT

(CCH)

4233[53(15)], at 7281-74 (Aug., 1981).
154. 1 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL-AUDIT (CCH) ch. 4233[53(16)] at 7281-75
(May, 1981). In the DuPont case, for example, the examining agent had used data in the
Service's SOURCE BOOK OF STATISTICS OF INCOME for 1960 to determine Du Pont's
§ 482 allocation for its 1960 tax return. 608 F.2d at 452-53. During pretrial discovery,
Du Pont tried to obtain the names of the corporations relied on by the agent. The trial
judge refused to grant the discovery requests, however, on the ground that the identity of
the companies was irrelevant. Brief for Plaintiff at 27 n.**. The Court of Claims noted
that the Service is precluded by statute from disclosing the names of companies contained in the Source Book. 608 F.2d at 452 n.19.
155. See Fuller, supra note 27, at 507 & n.133; Mihaly, supra note 17, at 754-55.
156. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
158. 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9374, at 83,952 (finding 101).
159. 608 F.2d at 451.
160. Id at 450-51.
161. Id at 454.
162. Id
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Department officials made when the regulation was issued show that
the regulation should be applied flexibly.163 The resale price method
should not require substantially comparable transactions to apply.
Material differences should not be used to defeat the application of
an appropriate method under the regulation; instead, adjustments
should be made to obtain better estimates of taxable income.
Although district courts and the Court of Claims normally require
taxpayers to prove the amount of their refund to prevail over an
arbitrary Service allocation under section 482, only Du Pont goes so
far as to require taxpayers to prove the amount of each material
adjustment.
III
REVITALIZING THE REGULATION'S
PROTECTIONS
The regulation attempts to define the limits of the Service's
broad power under section 482 to allocate income and deductions
between taxpayers under common control. Allocations are based on
arm's length transactions under market conditions. For intercompany sales of tangible property, the regulation provides specific
methods for calculating an arm's length price, based on transactions
similar to the transaction under audit.' 64 The arm's length standard
breaks down, however, if similar transactions are unavailable to
compare with the audited transaction. Any price is speculative and
possible estimates can vary widely. Absent a closely comparable
transaction, the regulation should be applied flexibly to compensate
for the difficulties in comparing available uncontrolled transactions.
In practice, the Service often has ignored the regulation, and in some
instances, has acted harshly toward taxpayers.1 65 Furthermore,
courts have required taxpayers who challenge section 482 allocations
not only to overcome the general presumption that the Service is correct, but also to prove that the allocation was arbitrary, capricious, or
66
unreasonable. 1
No adequate reason exists for placing this additional burden on
the taxpayer. Early predecessors of section 482 were designed to
prevent the deliberate and improper allocation of income and deductions between organizations under common control. 167 Today the
163. See supra note 72.
164. See supra notes 36-39, 43 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
167. The legislative history of one of § 482's predecessors illustrates that the section's
purpose is to prevent businesses from evading taxes "by the shifting of profits, the making of fictitious sales, and other methods frequently adopted for the purpose of 'milk-
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Service extends the application of section 482 to inadvertent cases of
income shifting. I68 Taxing the inadvertent shifting of income is reasonable, both because of the difficulties in proving the taxpayer's
motive, and because the shifted income is properly attributable to
United States operations. Imposing a burden of production on the
taxpayer that is more onerous than a presumption that the Service is
correct, however, is inappropriate when the taxpayer has not intentionally evaded its income tax obligation. In such a case, the allocation simply should be the best estimate of the proper amount of
income attributable to the operation. A best estimate allocation is
particularly appropriate when employing an objective standard, such
as the arm's length standard of the regulation. The regulation calls
for an allocation based on market prices, not one which necessarily
corresponds to the Service's sense of justice. Courts sometimes justify this additional burden by reasoning that Congress provided the
Service with wide discretion 169 in allocating income and deductions
between related corporations. 70 The Treasury Department promulgated the regulation, however, to define the limits of the Service's
171
power to allocate, not to expand that power.
A taxpayer that is unable to refer to similar transactions can
overturn an arbitrary Service allocation only if a court is willing to
apply the regulation's -methods broadly. A broad application
enables the court to account for the difficulty in obtaining price estimates based on market conditions. If a court interprets the regulation narrowly, as did the court in Du Pont, a taxpayer will rarely
succeed in overturning even an arbitrary Service allocation. 172
The Tax Court in the U.S. Steel case also interpreted the regulation narrowly. The regulation's provision regarding the performance of services defines an arm's length service charge as the charge
"for the same or similar services in independent transactions"
big."' H.R. REP. No. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1927), reprintedin 1939-1 (pt. 2)
C.B. 384, 395.
168. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(3), T.D. 6595, 1962-1 C.B. 43,51 (current regulation); Treas. Reg. 86, art. 45-1(c) (1934), BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, REGULATIONS 86 RELATING TO THE INCOME TAX UNDER THE REVENUE

ACT OF 1934, at 124 (1935), reprintedin [1935] 1 STAND. FED. TAX SERV. (CCH)

435A.
169. Section 482 gives the discretion to reallocate to the Secretary of the Treasury or

his delegate. See I.R.C. § 482, 7701(a)( l1)(B) (1976). The Secretary has delegated his
powers under section 482 to the district director. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (1962),

T.D. 6495, 1962-1 C.B. 43, 50; Cohen (1967), supra note 10, at 239.
170. See, e.g., Young & Rubicam, Inc. v. United States, 410 F.2d 1233, 1244 (Ct. Cl.

1969); Spicer Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner, 346 F.2d 704, 706 (6th Cir. 1965); Ballentine
Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 796, 800 (4th Cir. 1963); Campbell Ctr. State
Bank, Inc. v. Commissioner, 311 F.2d 374, 377 (8th Cir. 1963); Ach v. Commissioner, 42
T.C. 114, 126 (1964).
171. See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.

172. See supra notes 141-62 and accompanying text.
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involving "similar circumstances." 173 The Tax Court rejected using

the rates that Navios charged unrelated parties; the court apparently
believed that U.S. Steel had greater bargaining power with Navios
than Navios had with Navios's unrelated customers. 174 Concluding

that no similar transactions with or between unrelated parties could
possibly exist, the court devised its own method of allocation based

on what the court
determined to be a "reasonable" rate of return for
175
Navios's risk.

The Second Circuit rejected the Tax Court's approach. In the
appellate court's view, section 482 is "a broadly drawn statute"
which attempts only to ensure that intercompany prices approximate
176
market prices.
To say that [an unrelated party] was buying a service from Navios with one
set of expectations about duration and risk, and Steel another, may be to
recognize economic reality; but it is also to engraft a crippling degree of economic sophistication onto a broadly drawn statute, which. . . would allow
from the Commissioner's virtually unrestricted
the taxpayer no safe harbor
177
discretion to reallocate.
173. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(b)(3), T.D. 6998, 1969-1 C.B. 144, 144. See supra note 116
and accompanying text. The Tax Court incorrectly referred to language in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.482-1(d)(3), which refers to "independent transactions with unrelated parties under
the same or similar circumstances." 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 602. This provision, however,
applies to setoffs the Service should make after determining a non-arm's length price.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(3), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218, 220-21. The language in the
two provisions, however, is similar, so this Note compares the Tax Court's analysis with
the provisions of Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(b)(3).
174. See 617 F.2d at 950-51; 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 602-03.
175. The Tax Court's allocation was refined and complex. The court began with the
actual rates Navios charged for shipping goods to the United States. The court then
reduced these rates to compute that part of the rate attributable to Navios's ocean freight
operations. That computation required the court to subtract Navios's costs for inland
freight expense, but not its costs for idle vessel expense, from the full rate.
The Tax Court used two methods to compare the resulting ocean freight expense to
amounts that the court felt Navios should have received for purposes of § 482. First, the
court determined that, based on Navios's risk, a "reasonable profit" for Navios would be
20% over Navios's costs. The court subtracted Navios's ocean shipping costs plus 20%
from Navios's ocean shipment rates, for the years 1957 to 1960, to calculate Navios's
excess profit.
Second, the court attempted to recreate an arm's length price for Navios based on
prices that U.S. Steel paid to Universe Tankships, Inc., an independent shipper, in 1954.
The court took Universe's price and computed cost increases for each of the years 1957 to
1960 for fuel escalation, wage escalation, port expense, idle vessel expense, cargo insurance, management fees, and stevedoring costs. As with the first method, the court subtracted Navios's total costs, plus 20% to reflect a reasonable return for Navios, from
Navios's actual ocean shipment rates to calculate Navios's excess profit under this
method.
After these calculations, the court had two estimates of Navios's excess profit for each
year from 1957 to 1960. The court took the lower figure for each year, rounded to the
nearest hundred thousand, and allocated it to U.S. Steel. The court's total allocation
from Navios to U.S. Steel was twenty-seven million dollars. See 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at
604-05; Brief for the Commissioner at 13-15.
176. 617 F.2d at 951.
177. Id
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The Second Circuit said that the regulation calls for a "limited
approach" in calculating a hypothetical arm's length service
charge. 78 The court reasoned that the regulation should be applied

liberally when attempting to find comparable transactions between
unrelated parties; independent transactions should not be rejected
transactions be closely comfor comparison by requiring that those
179
transaction.
controlled
the
to
parable
The Second Circuit allowed U.S. Steel to justify its price to
Navios without first showing that the Service's allocation was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. U.S. Steel only had to show that
the fees it paid to Navios were equivalent to the fees the nine unrelated corporations paid to Navios--charges accounting for five percent of Navios's income during the period under scrutiny. 80 The
court then required the Government to make a "counter showing"
that the price Navios charged all of its customers was not an arm's
length service charge. 8 1 The regulation provides that an arm's
length charge for services rendered is "the amount which was
charged or would have been charged for the same or similar services
18 2
in independent transactions with or between unrelated parties."'
The court stated that once the taxpayer can establish that others were
charged the same price, "it has earned the right, under the Regulations, to be free from a § 482 reallocation despite other evidence
tending to show that its activities have resulted in a shifting of tax
178. Id at 950.
179. Id at 950-51.
180. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
181. 617 F.2d at 948.
182. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(b)(3), T.D. 6998, 1969-1 C.B. 144, 144; see supra note 116
and accompanying text.
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liability among controlled corporations."' 8 3 This holding goes
84
against precedent, but it is in accord with the regulation's purpose.1
183. 617 F.2d at 947. The various burdens of proof can be summarized as follows:
AND THE GOVERNMENT'S ALLOCATION WAS
Reasonable

If Taxpayer's
Original
Prices
Were Reasonable
T
A
X
p
A
y
E
R

And It
Can Prove
Reasonable
Amount
If Tax-Payer's
Original
Prices Were
Unreasonable
And It
Cannot Prove
Reasonable
Amount

Unreasonable

Tax Ct.:Service
Prevails
U.S. Steel: Taxpayer
Ct.of Claims &
District CL: Service
Du Pont: Service

All courts: Taxpayer
Prevails

Tax Ct.:Service
U.S.Steel.
?

Tax CL: Taxpayer
.S Steel.
Taxpayer

Ct of Claims &
District
C: Servie

CL of Claims &
District
CL- Service*

Du Pont: Service

Du Pont: Service

Allcourts: Service

Tax CL: Ct. determines
proper
allocation
U.S. Steel: Ct. determines
proper
allocation
CL of Claims: Service
District C: Service*
Du Pont: Service

*InBaldWln.ima-Hamilon Corp., however, the Seventh Circuit held that district courts may determine a proper allocation.
See upra note 149.

See s.spra notes 146-48 and accompanying text for the burden of production taxpayers
face in Tax Court cases. See supra notes 146, 149-51 and accompanying text for the
burden taxpayers face in Court of Claims cases. See id for the burden taxpayers face in
district court cases. See supra notes 118-19, 180-82 and accompanying text for the burden the Second Circuit imposed in the U.S. Steel case. See supra notes 161-62 and
accompanying text for the burden the Court of Claims imposed in the Du Pont case.
184. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text. Compare the recommendation
of the President's Task Force on Business Taxation:
[The Task Force recommends that Section 482 be amended to provide that the
burden of proof with respect to a determination made by the Commissioner
under Section 482 shall be on the Commissioner if the taxpayer submits to the
Service in due course a statement of the grounds (together with facts sufficient to
show the basis thereof) on which he relies to establish that the amount of the
item in question was fair and reasonable under all the circumstances.
PRESIDENT's TASK FORCE ON BUSINESS TAXATION, supra note 27, at 56-57.
Taxpayers arguing for adoption of the U.S. Steel approach in the Seventh Circuit will
have to deal with mixed precedent. The district court in United States Gypsum Co. found
for a taxpayer that showed that its controlled prices were a reasonable estimate of an
arm's length price, though the court implied the Service's allocation was also reasonable.
See United States Gypsum Co. v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 627, 634-35 (N.D. Ill.
1969), aft'd 452 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1971). The Seventh Circuit found that the district
court had incorrectly followed the arm's length standard. 452 F.2d at 449. The Seventh
Circuit, however, upheld the court's finding: "[We treat the district court's finding as
equivalent to a finding that the administrative decision that the charges were not arm's
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By requiring the taxpayer to make an initial showing that its prices
were arm's length, the court still recognizes the general presumption
1 85
that the Service is correct.
The Second Circuit, however, overlooked the effect of material
adjustments. U.S. Steel held that the Service could overcome U.S.
Steel's prima facie case only by showing that Navios's charges to its
other customers also deviated from a market price that the Commissioner could prove existed. 186 The court stressed that "'independent
transactions with or between unrelated parties' are enough to insulate a taxpayer's price from § 482."187 At another point the court
stated:
We think it clear that if a taxpayer can show that the price he paid or
was charged for a service is "the amount which was charged or would have
been charged for the same or similar services in independent transactions
with or between unrelated parties" it has earned the right, under the Regulations, to befreefrom a § 482 reallocationdespite otherevidence tendingto show
that its activities
have resultedin a shifting of tax liability among controlled
188
corporations.

These statements ignore the regulation's requirement that
adjustments be made for all material differences between the transactions under. comparison, a requirement that the regulation
stresses. 18 9 Assuming, for example, that Navios had insured U.S.
Steel's ore, but not other customers' ore, from the risk of loss during
transit, Navios's price to U.S. Steel should be adjusted upward by an
amount equal to the cost of insuring the ore during transit. The
material adjustment requirement should not be interpreted woodenly, however. In Du Pont, the court placed an onerous burden on
the taxpayer by requiring that it prove the amount of each adjustment before it could obtain any refund. Instead, the courts should
length charges was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious, and deem the finding not
clearly erroneous." Id at 449.
Taxpayers in the Fifth Circuit will have the precedent of DallasCeramic Co. in their
favor. See supra note 151. Taxpayers in the Court of Claims, of course, would be faced
with the hurdle of Du Pont and Eli Lilly. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
185. See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); Lucas v. Kansas City Structural Steel Co., 281 U.S. 264, 271 (1930); Williamsport Co. v. United States, 277 U.S. 551,
559 (1928); Wickwire v. Reinecke, 275 U.S. 101, 105 (1927).
186. 617 F.2d at 948.
187. 617 F.2d at 950 (emphasis added).
188. Id at 947 (emphasis added). At another point the court states:
The Regulations make it clear that if the taxpayer can show that the amount it
paid was equal to "the amount which was charged ...for the same or similar
services in independent transactions" he can defeat the Commissioner's effort to
invoke § 482 against him.... [If the prices paid were the same] /tlhe only question, then, is whether the transactions were "independent."
Id at 949 (emphasis added).
189. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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allow reasonable estimates for material adjustments when reviewing
section 482 allocations.
The Second Circuit may have been reacting to the Tax Court's
extremely detailed adjustments1 90 when it said that a taxpayer's price
would be "insulated" from any allocation under section 482. The
Tax Court used an incorrect method for determining the proper allocation. 191 When using a proper method, the Tax Court should adjust
for material differences as the regulation dictates. The Second Circuit should affirm the adjustments, if not clearly erroneous, as it
would in reviewing any other factual determination. Under the Second Circuit's apparent interpretation of the regulation, a taxpayer
can create controlled sales with preferential provisions so long as it
charges the same fee to all customers. This reading would allow a
taxpayer to avoid paying its full United States tax obligation by
including preferential terms in its controlled sales.
CONCLUSION
Since the early 1960's the Internal Revenue Service has vigorously applied section 482 to major United States corporations doing
business with foreign affiliates. The Treasury Department designed
the current regulation for section 482 to protect these corporations
from arbitrary Service allocations and double taxation of foreign
income. For sales of tangible goods, the regulation bases allocation
of income and deductions on transactions between unrelated parties
dealing at arm's length. The regulation defines the arm's length
price as the price agreed on in the transaction most similar to the
transaction being examined, after accounting for material differlences. Often, however, there are no similar uncontrolled transactions for comparison, thus making the regulation difficult to apply.
Taxpayers are then particularly vulnerable even to unreasonable
Service allocations. A liberal interpretation of the regulation is
therefore essential.
190. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
191. The Tax Court allowed a profit margin of 20% over Navios's costs. See supra
note 175. Instead of determining a profit margin based on gross profit margins from
uncontrolled transactions, the court calculated a "reasonable profit" margin for Navios,
based on subjective expectations of Navios's management:
[T]he management of Navios selected a return of 10 percent of costs, and later a
return of 20 percent of costs, as a basis for providing a reasonable profit ....
Suffice to say, that both Navios and the petitioner contemplated a return of from
10 to 20 per-percent [sic] on cost as a basis for justifying the freight charges.
36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 604. This allocation is reminiscent of the reasonable profit test that
the 1968 regulations and the courts have rejected. See supra note 29 and accompanying
text. The Second Circuit rejected the Tax Court's use of a "reasonable charge," because
the Second Circuit found that there were comparable uncontrolled transactions. See 617
F.2d at 950-51.
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The Court of Claims in E.. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
United States narrowly interpreted the regulation and imposed an
onerous burden of production on the taxpayer. The case threatens to
deprive taxpayers of any protection from the Service's broad discretion whenever closely comparable transactions are unavailable for
comparison. In UnitedStates Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, the Second Circuit interpreted the regulation more broadly, thereby reviving the protections that the regulation was designed to provide. U.S.
Steel is precedent for a fairer burden of production than has previously existed. Courts in other jurisdictions should follow the Second
Circuit's broad reading of the regulation and adopt the burden of
production it espoused. The Service, however, should be allowed to
adjust for any material differences between the transactions under
comparison.
Robert A. Voorhis

